Cargo security initiatives in the United States, Canada and Mexico and their effect on trade in the NAFTA region by Veiter, Daniela
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Daniela Veiter
Cargo security initiatives in the United States, Canada and Mexico and their
effect on trade in the NAFTA region
Working Paper
Original Citation:
Veiter, Daniela (2009) Cargo security initiatives in the United States, Canada and Mexico and their
effect on trade in the NAFTA region. Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik
- Logistik, 01/2009. Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik, WU Vienna University of Economics
and Business, Vienna.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/822/
Available in ePubWU: July 2010
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
 Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik
Institute of Transport Economics and Logistics
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
Schriftenreihe des  
Instituts für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik 
Nr. 1 (2009 LOG) 
Veiter, Daniela 
Zoll-Sicherheitsinitiativen in den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika, Kanada und Mexiko und ihr Einfluss auf den Handel in 
der NAFTA Region  
Herausgeber: die Professoren des Instituts für 
Transportwirtschaft und Logistik 
 
 
 
Institut für Transportwirtschaft und Logistik 
Univ.Prof. Dr. Sebastian Kummer 
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D I P L O M A R B E I T  
 
 
 
Cargo Security Initiatives in the United States, 
Canada and Mexico and their Effect on Trade in the 
NAFTA Region 
 
 
 
 
Academic advisor: Mag. Irene Sudy 
Field of research: Compliance Management: Security programs in supply chains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 By Daniela Veiter 
0450902 
21.09.2009 
 
  I 
Table of content 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................................... IV 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... VI 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................... VII 
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVE TARGET .............................................................................................. 4 
1.3 METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.4 DEMARCATION OF THE THESIS .................................................................................................................... 6 
2 ESSENTIALS ........................................................................................................................................ 7 
2.1 DEFINITION OF RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY...................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES ............................................................................... 11 
3 DESCRIPTION OF CARGO SECURITY INITIATIVES IN THE NAFTA REGION .............................................15 
3.1 SECURITY PROGRAMS BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ............................................................................ 16 
3.1.1 U.S. road security initiatives ..................................................................................................... 16 
3.1.1.1 Free And Secure Trade........................................................................................................................16 
3.1.1.2 Electronic Truck Manifest ...................................................................................................................19 
3.1.2 U.S. maritime security initiatives .............................................................................................. 20 
3.1.2.1 Container Security Initiative ...............................................................................................................21 
3.1.2.2 24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule.............................................................................................22 
3.1.2.3 Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements ..........................................................23 
3.1.2.4 Secure Freight Initiative ......................................................................................................................25 
3.1.3 U.S. air security initiatives......................................................................................................... 26 
3.1.3.1 Air Automated Manifest System .........................................................................................................26 
3.1.3.2 Physical screening of air cargo ............................................................................................................27 
3.1.4 U.S. rail security initiative ......................................................................................................... 27 
3.1.5 Other U.S. security initiatives .................................................................................................... 28 
3.1.5.1 Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism ....................................................................................28 
3.1.5.2 Importer Self-Assessment ..................................................................................................................31 
3.2 CANADA’S SECURITY PROGRAMS ............................................................................................................... 32 
3.2.1 Canadian road security initiatives ............................................................................................ 32 
3.2.1.1 EManifest for road carriers .................................................................................................................33 
3.2.1.2 Customs Self Assessment Program .....................................................................................................33 
3.2.1.3 The Commercial Driver Registration Program ....................................................................................33 
3.2.1.4 Free and Secure Trade ........................................................................................................................33 
3.2.2 Canada’s maritime security initiatives ...................................................................................... 34 
3.2.2.1 Marine Transportation Security Clearance Program ..........................................................................34 
3.2.2.2 Advance Commercial Information Marine Program ...........................................................................35 
3.2.2.3 Container Security Initiative ...............................................................................................................35 
3.2.3 Canadian air security initiative ................................................................................................. 36 
  II 
3.2.4 Canadian rail security initiatives ............................................................................................... 36 
3.2.4.1 Memorandum of Understanding on rail security ...............................................................................36 
3.2.4.2 EManifest for rail carriers ...................................................................................................................36 
3.2.5 Other Canadian security initiatives ........................................................................................... 36 
3.2.5.1 Importer Admissibility Data ................................................................................................................36 
3.2.5.2 Partnership in Protection ...................................................................................................................37 
3.3 MEXICO’S SECURITY PROGRAMS ............................................................................................................... 37 
3.3.1 Mexican road security initiatives .............................................................................................. 38 
3.3.1.1 Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program ...................................................................................38 
3.3.1.2 Free And Secure Trade........................................................................................................................39 
3.3.2 Mexican maritime security initiatives ....................................................................................... 39 
3.3.3 Mexican air security initiatives ................................................................................................. 39 
3.3.4 Mexican rail security initiatives ................................................................................................ 40 
3.4 PRIVATE COOPERATION INITIATIVES ........................................................................................................... 40 
3.4.1 Business Alliance for Secure Commerce .................................................................................... 40 
3.4.2 Transported Asset Protection Association ................................................................................ 41 
4 ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY INITIATIVES’ IMPACT ON NAFTA TRADE .................................................42 
4.1 COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT INITIATIVES ............................................................................................... 42 
4.2 ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY INITIATIVES ON A MACRO LEVEL ............................................................................ 46 
4.2.1 Working together across the borders ....................................................................................... 46 
4.2.1.1 Cooperation on security initiatives .....................................................................................................47 
4.2.1.2 Problems hindering the cooperation ..................................................................................................49 
4.2.1.3 Harmonization and standardization of existing security initiatives ....................................................51 
4.2.2 The security initiatives’ effect on trade in North America ........................................................ 52 
4.2.2.1 Long border wait times ......................................................................................................................52 
4.2.2.2 Increasing fees for crossing the border ..............................................................................................54 
4.2.2.3 Changing operating practices .............................................................................................................55 
4.2.2.4 Missing promised commercial benefits ..............................................................................................56 
4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY INITIATIVES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LOGISTICS PROVIDERS AND CARRIERS ................. 57 
4.3.1 Case study: Logistics providers ................................................................................................. 58 
4.3.1.1 Brief description of the interviewed logistics providers .....................................................................58 
4.3.1.2 Certifications and memberships .........................................................................................................60 
4.3.1.3 Benefits ..............................................................................................................................................62 
4.3.1.4 Increased costs ...................................................................................................................................64 
4.3.1.5 Increased work ...................................................................................................................................66 
4.3.1.6 Trade facilitation or hindrance for logistics providers ........................................................................68 
4.3.2 Case study: Carriers .................................................................................................................. 68 
4.3.2.1 Brief description of the interviewed carriers ......................................................................................69 
4.3.2.2 Certifications and memberships .........................................................................................................69 
4.3.2.3 Benefits ..............................................................................................................................................71 
4.3.2.4 Increased costs ...................................................................................................................................73 
4.3.2.5 Increased work ...................................................................................................................................75 
4.3.2.6 Trade facilitation or hindrance ...........................................................................................................78 
  III 
4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES ................................................................................................. 78 
5 CONCLUSION, OUTLOOK AND SUMMARY .........................................................................................82 
5.1 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 82 
5.2 OUTLOOK ............................................................................................................................................ 84 
5.3 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 84 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................88 
APPENDICES ....................................................................................................................................... 105 
  
  IV 
List of abbreviations 
10+2 rule  Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements 
24-Hour Rule  24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule 
3PL   Third Party Logistics Providers 
ACE   Automated Commercial Environment 
ACI   Advanced Commercial Information 
ACI Air   Advanced Commercial Information Air Program 
ACI Marine  Advanced Commercial Information Marine Program 
ACS   Automated Commercial System 
ABI   Automated Broker Interface 
Air AMS  Air Automated Manifest System 
AMACARGA  Asociacion Mexicana de Agentes de Carga, A.C. 
AMANAC  Asociacion Mexicana de Agentes Navieros, A.C. 
AMR   Advanced Manifest Rule 
AMS   Automated Manifest System 
APHIS   U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
ATS   Automated Targeting System 
BASC   Business Alliance for Secure Commerce 
BCS   Border Cargo Selectivity 
CBIP   Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program 
CBP   U.S. Customs Border Protection 
CBSA   Canada Border Services Agency 
CDRP   Commercial Driver Registration Program 
CFIA   Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
CIC   Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
CSA   Customs Self Assessment Program 
CSI   Container Security Initiative 
CSIS   Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
CSM   Container Status Messages 
C-TPAT  Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
DFO   Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
DHS   U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
EDI   Electronic Data Interchange 
e-manifest  Electronic Truck Manifest 
FAST   Free and Secure Trade 
FCL   Full-container load 
FDA   U.S. Food and Drug Administration   
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
HTSUS  Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
IAD   Importer Admissibility Data 
ICAO   International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICE   U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
  V 
IMO   International Maritime Organization 
IMSWG  Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group 
IMTC   International Mobility and Trade Corridor 
ISA   Importer Self-Assessment 
ISF   Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements 
ISPS Code  International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
ITDS   International Trade Data System 
JIT   Just in Time 
LCL   Less-than-container load 
LTL   Less-than-truckload 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
MSCP   Marine Security Contribution Program 
MTSA   Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
MTSCP  Marine Transportation Security Clearance Program 
MTSRs  Marine Transportation Security Regulations 
NACC   North American Competitiveness Council 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
NII   Non-Intrusive Inspection technology 
NVOCC  Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier 
ODP   U.S. Office for Domestic Preparedness 
OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OSC   Operation Safe Commerce 
PAPS   Pre-Arrival Processing System 
PARS   Pre-Arrival Review System 
PIP   Partnership in Protection 
Rail AMS  Rail Automated Manifest System 
RCMP   Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
RFID   Radio Frequency Identification 
SAFE Framework Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade 
SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability of Every Port Act of 2006 
SCAC   U.S. Standard Carrier Alpha Code 
SCSS   Supply Chain Security Specialist 
SFI   Security Freight Initiative 
sFTP   Secure File Transfer Protocol 
SPP   Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
TAPA   Technology Asset Protection Association 
TSA   U.S. Transportation Security Administration 
U.S.   United States of America 
USDA   U.S. Department of Agriculture 
WCO   World Customs Organization 
WHTI   Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
  
  VI 
List of figures  
Figure 1 A supply chain and its agents .......................................................................... 8 
Figure 2 Examples of agents in a supply chain ............................................................. 8 
Figure 3 Breakdown of total U.S. exports .................................................................... 13 
Figure 4 Breakdown of total U.S. imports .................................................................... 13 
Figure 5 U.S./Canada and U.S./Mexico Free And Secure Trade Logo ........................ 17 
Figure 6 Requirements for FAST participation............................................................. 18 
Figure 7 Automated Commercial Environment Logo ................................................... 19 
Figure 8 Container Security Initiative Logo.................................................................. 21 
Figure 9 Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism .............................................. 28 
Figure 10 ISA’s internal control components ............................................................... 31 
Figure 11 Timeline of introduction of different security programs ................................. 43 
Figure 12 YRC Reimer’s Border Crossing Process ..................................................... 77 
  
  VII 
List of tables  
Table 1 Vulnerability Threat Index ................................................................................. 2 
Table 2 Overview of trade in the United States, Canada and Mexico .......................... 12 
Table 3 Percentage of total U.S. trade by used mode of transportation and country ... 14 
Table 4 Overview of governmental and non-governmental initiatives .......................... 15 
Table 5 Overview of Advance Cargo Information Programs in the United States and 
Mexico ........................................................................................................................ 44 
Table 6 Comparison of existing carrier requirements versus new carrier requirements 45 
Table 7 Certifications of interviewed logistics providers ............................................... 61 
Table 8 Certifications of interviewed carriers ............................................................... 71 
  
  1 
1 Introduction 
This thesis talks about cargo security initiatives in the NAFTA countries of the United 
States, Canada and Mexico for any shipments crossing borders between those 
countries by either road, sea, air or rail. It shows the development and intensification of 
those security regulations over the last years, analyses their purpose and recommends 
how to best deal with them if you are a business located in this area. 
Chapter 1 explains the background and the reason why those security programs came 
into place. Furthermore, research questions are presented, the objective target of this 
paper as well as the methodology used. At the end of this chapter a demarcation 
excludes areas that are not being covered by this thesis. 
1.1 Problem statement 
Cross-border trade today is an essential driver of nations’ prosperity. A prolonged 
disruption in a supply chain has an enormous impact on a country’s as well as the 
global economy. The international transportation network and its long supply chains are 
very fragile and vulnerable to terrorist abuse or similar attacks. The high number of 
agents add another level of risk. The products, factories, supply chain facilities and 
supply chain partners, carriers, people and information could all present danger to the 
supply chain.1 Globalization turned the market place into a competitive environment 
where companies seek to hire the most affordable workers as well as choose the 
cheapest suppliers or service providers. This trend spreads business practices out all 
over the world and increases the need for transportation while adding complexity to a 
company’s value chain.2  
The most effective way is a worldwide cooperation of countries on securing the global 
trade system without hindering the trade flow. A global partnership involving all agents 
along a supply chain with harmonised and compatible systems, both for customs work 
and for the exchange of information would be the perfect solution. And collaboration 
and coordinated work reduces the risk of disruptions and is more cost-effective too.3 
 
Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington DC, the 
international trade community has dedicated more time and money on the issue of 
security. The U.S. government, the Canadian government and the Mexican 
government have established a multi-layered defense strategy to protect their people 
and country. International cargo that is being shipped to certain target countries poses 
                                               
1 Cf. Sarathy (2006), S. 32 and Ritter, Barrett and Wilson (eds.) (2007), p. xxi 
2 Cf. Ritter, Barrett and Wilson (eds.) (2007), p. xxi 
3 Cf. Kommerskollegium (2008), p. 7 
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a significant security risk. In particular, cargo containers can be abused to carry 
weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other dangerous items.  
Those containers are particularly vulnerable to changes from their legitimate 
commercial purpose due to the numerous transfers within the transport chain they are 
subject to.4 Those very same internationally moving containers, though, are of utter 
importance to global commerce as they ship about 95% of the world’s international 
cargo, in terms of value. Over 48 million containers are being shipped between 
seaports around the world. Intermodal transport has enabled trucks and trains to move 
goods around continents in the ocean containers.5 Any terrorist actions can have large-
scale damage to a country’s society and economy and thus it is essential to have 
systems in place that can prevent such events from happening beforehand. 
The United States of America was the first country to start introducing plans to identify 
high risk cargo shipments and soon Canada and Mexico followed. The initiatives seek 
to ensure security over different levels. There are three main areas of risk that these 
security initiatives seek to address. First, the security of vital cargo information relating 
to the contents and destination of the shipment must be accessible by customs 
authorities. This also includes IT security. Then there is the level of physical control 
through inspections and screening. The last level covers the entire supply chain 
through screening and background checks of every agent involved in the process.  
This includes all groups between the manufacturer and the final destination of the 
product. 
The different modes of transportation rail, maritime, air and road are all exposed to 
threats like terrorism; maritime and rail being the most vulnerable ones. Table 1 shows 
the extent of vulnerability of all modes of transportation that this thesis analyzes. 
 
Table 1 Vulnerability Threat Index 
Vulnerability Threat Index 
 
Road Medium 
Sea High 
Air Low 
Rail High 
 
(Source: Bragdon, 2008, p. 7) 
 
                                               
4 Cf. Kumar and Verruso (2008), p. 26 
5 Cf. Sewak (2008), p. 205 
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Air is categorized at low, because this area received the highest amount of subsidies 
and funding upgrading security infrastructure in the past years.6 
 
The problems arising from these security intensifications are numerous and affect 
different agents at different points along the supply chain. In the following paragraphs 
the most relevant effects will be mentioned. 
 
Governments of all three North American countries have introduced their own security 
initiatives. The problems that independently developed security agendas cause are a 
lack of governance and cooperation as well as overlapping programs. Different national 
priorities and levels of development add another level of difficulty to that problem. 
Slowly they are starting to introduce collaborative programs. Currently there is one 
public-private partnership including government institutions, importers, carriers, 
brokers, ports and other related industries in the process. Furthermore, cooperation 
between the United States, Canada and Mexico is already well established as far as 
commercial truck drivers crossing borders are concerned.7  
 
The most obvious effect on companies is how these initiatives impact their business 
practices and costs. Lean business processes have become more and more popular in 
the past years in response to competitive pressures to minimize carrying costs in the 
supply chain. While reducing stock costs, this increases the risk in case any disruptions 
occur.8 Companies using Just in Time (JIT) production, for example, may suffer from 
huge financial losses due to fewer finished products being sold when there is a delay 
somewhere along the supply chain. Due to the intensification of security regulations 
and the resulting stricter controls, a lot of time is lost due to waiting periods before the 
cargo is screened. It is true that the governments are working on trying to implement 
programs that expedite the border waiting time, but in reality long waiting times do still 
exist.  
Lately a trend into the other direction can be seen. Businesses tend to carry a larger 
safety stock to guarantee delivery of products if essential material is being held at the 
border. When applying for C-TPAT, companies need to expect certain loss of higher 
profit margins.9 
 
Businesses in this industry also face increased costs due to continuously changing 
regulations requiring updates to existing security procedures. The increased 
bureaucracy requires more work and often a new workforce is needed. Besides 
questionable claims of efficiency and performance, there are also funding issues that 
companies are facing. 
 
                                               
6 Cf. Bragdon (2008), p. 7 
7 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004c) 
8 Cf. Ritter, Barrett and Wilson (eds.) (2007) p. xxv 
9 Cf. Kumar & Verruso (2008), p. 30 
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Although the development of security initiatives present an increase in investment 
costs as well as ongoing and maintenance costs for companies and government 
agencies, they do offer protection or at least prevention for events that would have a 
much more tremendous impact and would in the end lead to much higher costs. 
According to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, the terror attacks of 9/11 
cost the United States about 2 trillion dollars.10 
1.2 Research questions and objective target 
With this thesis the author tries to answer the following research questions. 
 
What is the current state of security regulations in the United States, Canada and 
Mexico for any cargo that is crossing the border, what are the requirements and who is 
affected by them? 
 
How did the intensified security programs influence the existing trade relationship and 
cooperation between the three NAFTA countries? 
 
What kind of difficulties and challenges are businesses in the United States, Canada 
and Mexico facing due to the increasing number of security regulations? 
 
Are there any overlaps and is there potential for harmonization or standardization of the 
individual countries’ initiatives? 
 
The goal of this paper is to provide a complete overview of the existing security 
initiatives in North America highlighting their purpose and the processes involved. 
Furthermore, the author evaluates the status and effectiveness of those key security 
measures to make recommendations and recognize best practices where appropriate. 
Recommendations will include as to which programs are more important to take part in 
and how to make the implementation process fast and simple. 
1.3 Methodology 
At the beginning of this thesis a deep insight into the literature available for this specific 
topic is provided with the help of secondary data. Internet sources, books, journals, 
reports, videos and newspaper articles are used to embrace both basic literature as 
well as current developments. To cover a broad spectrum of knowledge and 
information the library sources of the Vienna University of Economics and Business in 
                                               
10 Cf. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (2003) 
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Austria, University of Alberta in Western Canada and Queen’s University in Eastern 
Canada are used. Due to the daily relevance of this topic, most information is taken 
from internet sources to ensure that it is as up to date as possible. Furthermore, the 
author trusted mostly different government agencies and international organizations for 
real-time updates. 
After a theory analysis this paper presents a practical, qualitative analysis. The focus is 
on the impact of security programs on businesses in North America and empirical data 
has been collected by interviewing companies in the United States of America, Canada 
and Mexico. The data explicitly collected for this thesis is a primary source.11 
The companies are the research unit and will be presented in form of case studies.12 
Although individual organizations are interviewed they can -as far as the research goal 
is concerned- be considered a unit. The individual interviewed people are the statistical 
unit.13 The spectrum of interviewees is reduced to companies that are affected the most 
as the security initiatives represent the companies’ core business.  
In the literature so-called typical cases are chosen as they seem to be characteristic for 
the universe.14 
The author identified two types of businesses that are dealing with those initiatives 
every day and are mostly affected by them – logistics service providers and carriers. 
Logistics providers have been chosen as they cover most areas of a supply chain 
including exporting and/or importing, organising the shipments and handling the 
customers’ paperwork. Carriers were chosen, because they are directly affected by the 
stringent requirements on facilities and the actual transportation process. For them 
compliance with those security initiatives has become core to their business in order to 
service transnational clients effectively. The possibility of generalisation with the 
number of conducted interviews is given as all companies are operating in all three 
countries across North America. Furthermore, multiple interviews covering people from 
different geographical as well as organizational areas within the companies support the 
validation of the results. Different sizes of the companies will make it possible to 
examine different reactions to and handling of security initiatives by small and medium 
businesses versus large corporations. 
The interview method used is semi-structured interviews.15 The interviews were 
structured on the basis of prepared and pre-verbalized questions. A questionnaire was 
set up with open questions. The interviewer had the possibility of changing the order of 
questions during the conversation while following a general guideline.16 The interviews 
were personal interviews in one of the companies’ facilities, telephone interviews or e-
mail correspondence with key people in this specific area. 
                                               
11 Cf. Albers, Klapper, Konradt, Walter and Wolf (eds.) (2007), p. 12 
12 Cf. Schnell, Hill, & Esser (2005), p. 249 
13 Cf. Schnell, Hill, & Esser (2005), p. 250 
14 Cf. Schnell, Hill, & Esser (2005), p. 299 
15 Cf. Schnell, Hill, & Esser (2005), p. 322 and Atteslander and Cromm (2003), p. 147 
16 Cf. Schnell, Hill, & Esser (2005), p. 322 
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1.4 Demarcation of the thesis 
This thesis talks about security initiatives in the United States of America, Canada and 
Mexico. It does not deal with security initiatives that are developed by any European or 
Asian government. And it only relates to security requirements for shipments going into 
one of those three countries.  
The paper focuses on the transportation of goods and cargo and does not cover the 
security and safety of passengers travelling with the different transportation modes.  
It does not analyse the customs clearance process itself, any required customs 
documents or Incoterms. The analysis deals only with the security related part of the 
cross-border process. 
Furthermore, it ignores pipelines as a mode of transportation. 
This paper uses information from the mentioned sources until August 30, 2009. Any 
new development after this mentioned date is not being considered in this work. 
  
  7 
2 Essentials 
In the first part of this chapter relevant terms used in this thesis will be defined. 
Furthermore, a short description of the involved government institutions will be given. In 
chapter 2.2 the author will provide a quick glance at the trade relationship between the 
NAFTA countries United States, Canada and Mexico. 
2.1 Definition of relevant terminology 
In this section an overview about the most important relevant terminology that is used 
in this thesis will be given. It is in particular interesting to compare European views with 
North American views. 
 
According to the European author David Lowe, Logistics comprises the complete 
supply and movement of goods from the source of the material all the way to the end 
consumer. It includes the planning and organizing through all stages of production, 
assembly, packing, storage, handling and distribution.17 
The American Author Wallace Little understands logistics also as the outbound 
movement of materials, parts, finished goods and supplies. Furthermore, he adds the 
purchasing as a further level.18 
 
David Lowe describes transport as “anything and everything to do with operation of 
goods vehicles and movement of goods.”19 
The Americans add another parameter. To them transportation also means the 
commercial life along with the movement of goods and people from one point to 
another.20 
 
Supply Chain is a rather modern word. Lowe’s Dictionary of Transport and Logistics 
describes a supply chain as the ongoing connector between the initial supply of raw 
materials, continuing with production and then eventually to the finished good being 
delivered to the end customer. Furthermore, he adds a second description identifying 
supply chain as all processes within one or between multiple businesses that meet 
consumer needs.21 
 
 
                                               
17 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 147 
18 Cf. Little (1977), p. 195 
19 Lowe (2002), p. 255 
20 Cf. Little (1977), p. 361 
21 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 236 
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Figure 1 is an example of a simple supply chain from the manufacturer to the importer. 
 
Figure 1 A supply chain and its agents 
 
(Source: Own creation) 
 
Of course there can be a higher number of agents involved. The following graph shows 
examples of agents that can be involved in a supply chain within the different areas of 
export, transport, border crossing and import. 
 
Figure 2 Examples of agents in a supply chain 
 
(Source: Own creation after Kommerskollegium) 
 
The supply chain might also include warehouses and consolidation processes and/or 
intermodal exchange. 
 
Supply chain management is not only simplistically the management of the supply 
chain, but it includes all processes that turn raw materials into finished products, 
generating profit and delivering on time and to the customer’s satisfaction.22 
 
Safety tries to prevent accidents, like damages and road accidents. It is the umbrella 
term for activities that are trying to ensure safe processes for example during transport, 
transshipment or storage.23 
 
Security addresses all activities dealing with intentional unlawful and/or harmful acts. 
                                               
22 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 236 
23 Cf. Blümel, Boevé, Recagno and Schilk (eds.) (2008), p. 2 
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Security initiatives try to prevent incidents like crime and terrorism.24 
 
Supply chain security involves a whole range of activities that can be grouped into the 
following big four categories: physical security, personnel security, procedural security 
and information security.25 
 
Under the term compliance proactive and holistic strategies are understood that assure 
that laws are being followed correctly. This includes state laws as well as current 
regulations.26  
 
 
Now the most common agents within a supply chain will be explained and respective 
differences will be pointed out. 
 
Lowe describes a carrier as a transport operator in his European view.27  
The American point of view is very similar. A carrier’s business is the transportation of 
goods.28 The dictionary of international trade adds that it can be an individual or a legal 
entity and that this agreement must underlie a contract of carriage.29 
 
Lowe describes a broker as an intermediary between consignor of freight and carrier. 
Road hauliers are an example.30 
According to the American author Little a broker is also a ship agent that acts in the 
name of a ship owner and does business for the ship.31 
 
Third party logistics is another modern word that is only used by logisticians since a 
few years. Under third party logistics, also called 3PL, logisticians mean logistics 
service provided by an external contractor.32 
 
In the European dictionary of Transport and Logistics Lowe identifies freight forwarders 
as companies acting as agents for other firms in organizing the movement of cargo. 
They offer the complete range of services like organization, administration, 
documentation and insurance. While the freight forwarder uses his full experience in 
complex legal and documentary requirements, in particular in international trade, the 
                                               
24 Cf. Blümel, Boevé, Recagno and Schilk (eds.) (2008), p. 2 
25 Cf. Blümel, Boevé, Recagno and Schilk (eds.) (2008), p. 6 
26 Cf. Roth (2000), pp. 1-6 
27 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 34 
28 Cf. Little (1977), p. 65 
29 Cf. Hinkelman (2002), S. 33 
30 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 27 
31 Cf. Little (1977), p. 56 
32 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 245 
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firm can concentrate on its core business.33 
Cavinato has a very similar approach, but stresses the fact that his ultimate goal is to 
expedite the outward movement of goods.34 
Little, with his American point of view, adds another description. Freight forwarders 
accept less-than-carload (LCL) or less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments from different 
companies and combine them. While they charge the shipper on the basis of LCL size 
shipments they pay the carrier on the basis of CL shipments. This covers the freight 
forwarders’ costs and generates a profit.35 
 
A Customs broker is a licensed individual or firm that is allowed by a country’s customs 
authority to handle custom documents and other formalities for companies in order to 
ensure a fast and legal way of exporting and importing goods.36 
 
A non-vessel-operating common carrier (NVOCC) is “a shipping company issuing bills 
of ladings for the carriage of goods on vessels he neither owns nor operates.”37 
 
A Bill of Lading or short B/L is a legal document of title. It is a receipt of goods that are 
shipped by sea stating the terms on which the goods are carried.38  
Cavinato sees the bill of lading as a contract for transportation between the shipper and 
the carrier.39 
 
 
Several government institutions are involved in the whole border-crossing process. 
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in this text referred to as CBP, is the U.S. 
customs authority. Its major responsibility is to keep terrorists and dangerous weapons 
out of the United States while securing and facilitating trade. It is the largest and most 
complex part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).40 
 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is the Canadian customs authority. Its 
purpose is to provide integrated border services making security and public safety a 
priority. Furthermore, they try to facilitate the free flow of people and goods.41 
  
Transport Canada implements legislation, regulations, standards and policies to 
                                               
33 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 99 
34 Cf. Cavinato (1982), p. 95 
35 Cf. Little (1977), p. 145 
36 Cf. Hinkelman (2002), S. 54 
37 Lowe (2002), p. 169 
38 Cf. Lowe (2002), p. 23 
39 Cf. Cavinato (1982), p. 28 
40 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009d) 
41 Cf. CBSA, 2009f) 
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monitor and enforce security policies. They use licenses, certificates, registrations and 
permits, audits, inspections and surveillance and in instances of non-compliance they 
take appropriate enforcement action.42 
 
Administración General de Aduanas is the Mexican customs authority.43 
2.2 Trade relationship between the NAFTA countries  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1992 by the 
presidents of the three North American countries United States of America, Canada 
and Mexico. After having been ratified in 1993, it took effect on January 1, 1994. This 
agreement established a free-trade zone lifting tariffs on most of the goods 
manufactured in the signatory countries. The idea also included gradual elimination of 
any barriers to cross-border movement of goods and services as well as investments.44  
To save taxes on cross-border shipments, a certificate of origin has to be completed. 
An example form can be found in appendix 1. Generally a comment saying “Made in 
Canada” is enough to proof where the good was manufactured. Tax exemption is also 
granted when a NAFTA related document is completed.45 
 
Trade among the three NAFTA countries soared since the signing of the agreement. 
From 1993 to 2006 trade increased by 198% from $297 billion to $883 billion.46 In 2007 
the total trade in goods already hit $930 billion.47 The countries’ economies have grown 
by over 40 percent since the introduction of NAFTA.48 
 
Table 2 gives a comparison of the most important trade indicators of the three NAFTA 
members United States, Canada and Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
42 Cf. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2005) 
43 Cf. Administración General de Aduanas (2009) 
44 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009e) 
45 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
46 Cf. Office of the United States Trade Representative (2007) 
47 Cf. U.S. Department of Commerce (2008), p. 26 
48 Cf. U.S. Department of Transportation (2007a) 
  12 
Table 2 Overview of trade in the United States, Canada and Mexico 
 United States Canada Mexico 
Population (2007) 301,621,000 32,976,000 105,281,000 
GDP (million current 
US$, 2007) 
13,811,200 1,326,376 893,364 
Trade per capita 
(US$, 2005-2007) 
11,994 27,134 5,158 
Rank in World 
Exports (2007) 
3 10 15 
Rank in World 
Imports (2007) 
1 10 14 
Value of 
Merchandise 
Exports, f.o.b. 
(million US$, 2007) 
1,162,479 420,693 271,821 
Value of 
Merchandise 
Imports, c.i.f. 
(million US$, 2007) 
2,020,403 389,911 295,201 
 
(Source: http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CA,MX,US) 
 
There are several interesting facts to take out of this table. The first thing that should be 
highlighted is the large difference of population of those three countries. The United 
States has ten times as many people as Canada and triple the number of people of 
Mexico. 
While Mexico has roughly three times the population of Canada, its GDP is only slightly 
greater than half of Canada’s GDP. And while Canada has only a tenth of the United 
States’ population, its trade per capita is three times the amount of the U.S. trade per 
capita. This clearly ranks Canada as the most international trade intensive economy of 
the three countries. Mexico’s economy, on the other hand, is still very slow.  
Furthermore, the table clearly shows that the United States is far ahead of Canada as 
well as Mexico in terms of its rank as an importing and exporting country in the world. It 
is the world’s number one in imports with a value of over $2 trillion in the year 2007. As 
the world’s number three in exports its merchandise sold to other countries in 2007 was 
of a value of just over $1.1 trillion. Canada follows far behind on place 10 for both 
imports and exports. Mexico is the world’s number 14 as far as imports go and number 
15 for exports. 
 
For the United States to be the largest trader of goods in the world, it depended highly 
on its two neighbouring countries Canada and Mexico. Canada and Mexico are the 
United States’ first and second largest export markets.49 Figure 3 shows a breakdown 
of the U.S. total exports.  
 
 
 
                                               
49 Cf. Office of the United States Trade Representative (2007), p. 1 
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Figure 3 Breakdown of total U.S. exports 
 
(Source: Own creation after 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CA,MX,US) 
 
21% of all exports of the United States go into Canada and 12% go into Mexico. It is 
true that the European Union accounts for 21% of all U.S. exports, but when you split it 
up into the individual European countries, no single country exceeds Mexico or 
Canada. The number of U.S. merchandise exported to its NAFTA partners also grew 
more rapidly than the number of exports to the rest of the world.50 
 
Figure 4 shows the breakdown of all U.S. imports.  
 
Figure 4 Breakdown of total U.S. imports 
 
(Source: Own creation after 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CA,MX,US 
 
Canada and Mexico are on third and fourth place after the EU and China. U.S. goods 
imports from Canada and Mexico grew by 247% from 1993 to 2007. They reached the 
sum of $523.9 billion in the year 2007.51 
                                               
50 Cf. Office of the United States Trade Representative (2007), p. 1 
51 Cf. U.S. Department of Commerce (2008), p. 26 
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Knowing the amount of trade happening between the United States and its NAFTA 
partners, it is now interesting to take a look at the breakdown of the shipments by mode 
of transportation used. Table 3 splits up the enormous amount of goods that cross the 
border between the three NAFTA countries every day by road, sea, air and rail. 
 
Table 3 Percentage of total U.S. trade by used mode of transportation and country 
 Canada Mexico 
Road 36.75% 28.90% 
Sea 31.11% 61.35% 
Air 0.09% 0.08% 
Rail 32.04% 9.67% 
 
(Source: http://nats.sct.gob.mx/nats/sys/tables.jsp?i=3&id=18) 
 
Two modes of transportation clearly stand out when looking at this table. For Canada it 
is the road. The facilitation of commercial traffic between Canada and the U.S. clearly 
fosters the transport by trucks for shipments between the United States and its 
northern neighbour. For Mexico the highest percentage of shipments are transported 
by ship. Very specific and more stringent regulations on road traffic explain the higher 
percentage of maritime shipments between the U.S. and Mexico. 
 
Although NAFTA is supposed to improve all aspects of doing business between 
Canada, the U.S. and Mexico52, this is not the case with all aspects of trade. While the 
customs process is simplified enormously, the security regulations for cross-border 
shipments have not decreased. The following chapter will provide the reader with an 
overview of the existing cargo security initiatives in the NAFTA area.  
                                               
52 Cf. U.S. Department of Commerce (2008), p. 26 
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3 Description of cargo security initiatives in the 
NAFTA region 
In the following chapter an overview of all existing cargo security programs and 
initiatives in North America will be given. 
There are three possible ways to classify those initiatives: 
 By their initiating body 
 Whether they are compulsory or voluntary and 
 By the mode of transportation. 
 
To provide the reader with an overview Table 4 shows which initiatives and programs 
were initiated by a state/supranational body, which by a non-governmental 
organisation, which programs are mandatory and which are voluntary. 
 
Table 4 Overview of governmental and non-governmental initiatives 
 Governmental Non-governmental 
Compulsory e-manifest, 24 hour-rule, 
ISF, Air AMS, Rail AMS 
 
Voluntary CSI, C-TPAT, SFI, ISA, 
FAST, CSA 
BASC, TAPA 
(Source: Own Creation) 
 
Generally it can be said that all compulsory programs were implemented by 
governments and they cover the area of information processes. This includes the 
required information about the specific commodities as well as backgrounds of 
companies and their people. Programs for the physical control and inspection are 
voluntarily, although non-compliance leads to enormous waiting times and delays. 
Therefore, the so-called voluntary initiatives can be better categorized necessary 
programs in order to maintain competitiveness within the supply chain. In most cases 
the market and its demanding customers request that its business partners are 
compliant with those programs.  
 
The author chose to subdivide this section into programs initiated by the U.S. 
government, the Canadian government and the Mexican government. The corporate 
initiatives are described in chapter 3.4. Furthermore, the initiatives are categorized by 
mode of transportation - they will be divided into maritime, road, air and rail initiatives. 
 
The United States were the first ones to develop and implement initiatives and 
programs with the purpose of securing the transportation chains. After the terror attacks 
of September 11, 2001 the U.S. government dedicated special focus towards ensuring 
that no further intrusion into the United States either by cargo or a mode of 
transportation itself is possible. The United States distinctively states which security 
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standards it wants from whom and its initiatives are all very clearly defined in extensive 
detail on CBP’s website. During this same period, Canada and Mexico started 
developing their own programs. The Canadian and Mexican programs, however, seem 
to be less developed and less specific than the U.S. ones. For example, the Canadian 
security requirements focus more on desired outcomes from the entire security 
process. This means that they are much less explicit about which vendors or agents 
must produce information. They simply say that certain information must be provided. 
There is also a greater emphasis in educating businesses on the government’s role in 
the process. It gives the impression that they try to put more pressure on their own 
government rather than the individual supply chain agents to achieve security 
outcomes. Mexico’s customs authority does not have a central website yet where all 
required security standards are summarized. 
Starting with the United States, the following sections will give a description of all 
existing security initiatives. The U.S. programs will be explained in greatest detail, while 
the Canadian and Mexican initiatives will be explained shortly. 
3.1 Security programs by the United States of America 
The most important institution concerning border crossing in the United States is the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP is the border security agency within 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). All security initiatives are based on 
the requirements stated in the Trade Act of 2002.  
The tools that are being used by CBP to make the below mentioned programs a 
success are Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), Importer Self-Assessment 
(ISA) and pre-arrival processing system (PAPS).  
In the following chapters those initiatives will be described into more detail. 
3.1.1 U.S. road security initiatives 
In North America most goods are transported by truck.53 The method of road 
transportation is very sensitive to interruptions and congestions that can easily lead to 
enormous delays.54 That is why it is especially important to have security initiatives that 
ensure fast and effective processing on the borders. On the following pages the U.S. 
truck security initiatives are described more into detail. 
3.1.1.1 Free And Secure Trade 
The Free And Secure Trade (FAST) program aims at expediting the processing of low-
                                               
53 Cf. North American Transportation Statistics (2008) 
54 Cf. Kummer (2006), p.69 
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risk and pre-registered commercial truck drivers, so-called trusted shippers, entering 
the U.S. either from Canada or Mexico. The truck drivers can be U.S. truck drivers as 
well as Canadian or Mexican truck drivers.55 The FAST program is managed by CBP 
and was a result of the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
program56 that will be described into detail later on.  
 
Two categories can be differentiated:  
 the U.S./Canada FAST program and  
 the U.S./Mexico FAST program.  
 
Figure 5 U.S./Canada and U.S./Mexico Free And Secure Trade Logo 
(Source: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/fast/us_canada/ 
us_canada_information.ctt/us_canada_information.doc  and http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/ 
cargo_security/ctpat/fast/us_mexico/mexico_fast.ctt/mexico_fast.doc) 
 
Figure 5 shows the programs’ logos. The U.S./Canada FAST program started in 
December 200257, whereas the U.S./Mexico FAST program started only at the end of 
September 2003.58 
FAST members enter designated FAST lanes at the border and an immediate 
identification of vehicles, shipments and drivers takes place. The company only has to 
send the electronic information before the truck arrives at the border. Upon the truck’s 
arrival at the border, the border agent receives information about the carrier and the 
pre-submitted shipment through the vehicle’s transponder as well as information about 
the driver through the FAST Commercial Driver card.59 To participate in FAST there are 
several requirements for the importer, carrier and driver and complete background 
checks of all of them are made.60 The application form that needs to be completed to 
become a FAST commercial driver can be found in appendix 2. 
 
Figure 6 on the next page shows the respective requirements for each agent:61  
 
 
 
                                               
55 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008d) 
56 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009j) 
57 Cf. U.S. CBP (2005a), p. 2 
58 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009l), p. 2 
59 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009j) 
60 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008d) 
61 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009j) 
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Figure 6 Requirements for FAST participation 
 
(Source: Own Creation after http://nemo.cbp.gov/fastlane/fast_dl.exe) 
 
Furthermore, the shipment must be processed using the pre-arrival processing system 
(PAPS).62 PAPS shipments get a unique barcode consisting of the U.S. Standard 
Carrier Alpha Code (SCAC) and Pro-Bill number and it gets attached to the invoice as 
well as the truck manifest before entering the U.S. After the information has been sent 
to a U.S. customs broker, a Border Cargo Selectivity (BCS) entry is prepared in ACS. 
At the border a customs officer scans the barcode and the entry information from ACS 
is automatically retrieved. If there is no need for an inspection, the truck is immediately 
released.63   
 
CBP lists several advantages with FAST:64 
 Thanks to dedicated lanes, trans-border shipments can be processed faster 
and more efficient. 
 There are fewer delays at the border due to fewer inspections. 
 For CBP inspections, FAST members are always first to be in line. 
 The United States, Canada and Mexico experience improved supply chain 
security while their economic prosperity is being protected. 
 And a benefit for FAST drivers is that the FAST Commercial Driver card is 
accepted as a valid travel document equivalent to a passport for purposes of 
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)65. Non-U.S. citizens, however, 
must still in addition present appropriate immigration documents when entering 
the U.S.66  
                                               
62 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009j) 
63 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009k) 
64 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008d) 
65 Implemented in June 2009, the WHTI tries to provide the general public with compliant border 
documentation like NEXUS and FAST cards, enhanced drivers licenses and enhanced 
identification cards to expedite the crossing process and prevent people from avoiding cross-
border travel and tourism due to bureaucracy. For more details see 
http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/evlsrujxbtkzuprf3tjl43e462a373cqerpd2j3e3ca4gyg
nip3v3h6dtwsu4zhhfgfozha4pru5jxbhtrxdizcqh4f/0907_sharedborder.pdf. 
66 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008e), p. 1 
•C-TPAT certificationImporter
•C-TPAT certification
•FAST membershipCarrier
•FAST membership
•Possesion of FAST Commercial Driver cardDriver
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3.1.1.2 Electronic Truck Manifest 
The Electronic Truck Manifest is also referred to as the e-manifest and it was initially 
started in October 2002 with a test run for about 2 years.67 It is built as a partnership 
and members of the trade community have actively been involved in forming it.68  
CBP requires an e-manifest from truck carriers 1 hour prior to arrival at a U.S. land port 
of entry. FAST participants only need to submit it half an hour before the arrival. In 
appendix 3 an example of an ACE truck manifest is provided. It includes information 
about the shipment, crew, conveyance and equipment as applicable. This data is then 
used by CBP officers to pre-screen the truck before it arrives at the border. At the gate 
CBP officers look at the pre-filed entries and either release the truck immediately or 
send it to a secondary inspection.69 This enormously shortens the waiting time for truck 
drivers. The e-manifests decreased processing time at borders on average by 33% and 
saved the customs personnel 1000 hours per week on paper work.70 
To file e-manifests the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is used.71 ACE is 
the commercial trade processing system and Figure 7 shows its logo CBP is using.  
 
Figure 7 Automated Commercial Environment Logo 
 
(Source: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/printer_fact_sheets/ace_print_sheets/ 
ace_fact_sheet.ctt/ace_fact_sheet.pdf) 
 
This customized data portal represents a centralized online access point for CBP, other 
participating government agencies and the trade community. It provides information 
concerning cargo shipments as well as communications in a secure way.72 ACE’s basic 
pillars are speed, accuracy, economy and safety.73 
As of today, ACE is also used by ocean and rail carriers as well as importers, service 
providers, brokers, facility operators and foreign trade zone operators. In the future the 
goal is to have a single, standardized, multi-modal manifest system for all modes of 
transportation, including air.74 
                                               
67 Cf. U.S. Department of the Treasury (2002), p. 1 
68 Cf. U.S. DHS (2008b) 
69 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008g) 
70 Cf. U.S. DHS (2008b) 
71 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008g) 
72 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009c) 
73 Cf. U.S. DHS (2008b) 
74 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009c) and U.S. CBP (2008h) 
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3.1.2 U.S. maritime security initiatives 
To enhance the security of ships and port facilities worldwide, the IMO developed the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS-Code) in 2002 and went into 
effect on July 1, 2004.75 This comprehensive set of security measures and procedures 
has two parts, Part A being mandatory and Part B being recommendations. 
The main goals of this program are:76 
 To build international cooperation between governments and the shipping and 
port industries to be better able to identify security threats to internationally 
used ships and port facilities. 
 To assign roles and responsibilities for the various agents in the international 
maritime transportation system. 
 To ensure exchange of security-related information. 
 To develop security assessment methods, ship and port facility security plans 
including actions to take in reaction to changing security levels. 
 
The U.S. counterpart to the ISPS Code is the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 (MTSA), which includes key provisions like:77 
 Vulnerability assessments of facilities and vessels 
 National, area, vessel and facility security plans 
 Biometric security cards 
 Maritime Safety and Security Teams 
 Maritime security grant program 
 Foreign port assessment program 
 Automatic Identification Systems and 
 Regional Maritime Security Advisory Committees. 
 
The Security and Accountability of Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) states that 
electronic transmission of security data elements prior to loading at foreign seaports 
should help to better identify high-risk shipments.78 
The SAFE Port Act also requires the U.S. to evaluate the feasibility of a 100% 
screening of cargo destined for the U.S. for radiation. This should initially be done in 
three test ports.79 
 
In late 2002 Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) was started80 by DHS, Office for 
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) together with the three largest U.S. container load 
centers and other supply chain agents. It is a collaborative partnership providing grants 
                                               
75 Cf. International Maritime Organization (2002) 
76 Cf. Bennett (2008), p. 165 
77 Cf. Bennett (2008), p. 173 
78 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 2 
79 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007f) 
80 Cf. World Shipping Council (2002), p. 2 
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with the goal of developing, testing and sharing best practices in the secure movement 
of containerized cargo.81 This program was initiated as a test base to identify 
vulnerabilities in the supply chain and develop security initiatives that address those 
vulnerabilities.82  
In the following chapters the U.S. security programs for sea shipments are described. 
3.1.2.1 Container Security Initiative 
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) tries to prevent maritime containers being 
misused by terrorists to deliver a weapon to the U.S. This initiative was developed 
shortly after the terror attacks of New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 
and it got implemented in January 2002.83 Figure 8 shows the logo under which CBP 
promotes this program. 
 
Figure 8 Container Security Initiative Logo 
 
(Source: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_in_brief.xml)  
 
Its goal is to curtail the threat to U.S. border security and global trade in general by 
ensuring that before placing containers on vessels destined for the United States, 
potential risky containers are identified, pre-screened and inspected in the foreign 
port.84 The idea is to push the U.S. border outwards creating an extended security 
zone.85 This gives the United States more time to react to suspicious shipments rather 
than dealing with them when they are already on U.S. ground. This initiative is not 
compulsory and goods can still be shipped into the U.S. from non-CSI ports, but 
enormous delays due to more stringent examinations of the cargo as soon as it enters 
the United States must be expected. 
With CSI U.S. officers both from the CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) are stationed in foreign ports all over the world and cooperate with the host 
foreign governments identifying security criteria for targeting high-risk containers. CSI 
uses technology to pre-screen rapidly in order to prevent trade from slowing down. 
Technologies they are using include X-ray, gamma ray machines, radiation detection 
devices and other non-intrusive inspection technology (NII).86 So-called “smart” 
containers are being used where a security seal helps officers on U.S. ground to 
                                               
81 Cf. U.S. DHS (2005), p. 4 
82 Cf. U.S. Department of Transportation (2002) 
83 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007a), p. 1 and U.S. CBP (2006a), p. 1 
84 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008a) 
85 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007j) 
86 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008a) 
  22 
identify containers that have been tampered during shipment.87 There are two types of 
smart containers, one with radio frequency identification (RFID) technology88 and the 
other with a group of sensors capable of detecting any impacts, even speed, change in 
temperature or shock.89 Host country customs officers examine the containers whereas 
the U.S. personnel does the security screening.90 
The program is meant to be reciprocal. CBP promotes that other countries should send 
customs personnel to major U.S. ports to overlook maritime containers being shipped 
from the U.S. to their countries. Japan and Canada already stationed officers in some 
U.S. ports.91 According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), though, not many countries have sent their officers to U.S. 
ports.92 
As of 2009 there are 58 CSI ports all over the world. 13 are situated in North and South 
America, 23 in Europe, 20 in Asia and 2 in Africa. A complete list of all current CSI 
certified ports can be found in appendix 4.93 
The future looks difficult for supply chain agents. By 2012 the U.S. is aiming to screen 
and search 100% of the containers destined for the U.S. and not only those that have 
been identified as a potential risk. Besides searching through documents, companies’ 
backgrounds and bill of ladings as they are doing it right now, they want to screen 
every single container before it leaves the foreign port in direction to the United 
States.94  
3.1.2.2 24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule 
The 24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule, more shortly referred to as the 24-hour 
rule or AMR, is in force since February 2003.95 Carriers and/or NVOCC carriers are 
required to send a cargo declaration to CBP 24 hours before cargo is laden aboard a 
vessel in a foreign port.96 The detailed information about the content of the sea 
containers is then being used by CBP to identify potential high-risk containers that 
could be a threat to U.S. national security long before they actually enter American 
grounds.97 
 
                                               
87 Cf. U.S. CBP (2006a) 
88 RFID makes it possible to identify containers that have been tampered during transit by using 
radio frequency technology. For more details see Kommerskollegium (2008).  
89 Cf. Sewak (2008), p. 214 
90 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007a), p. 4 
91 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008a) 
92 Cf. OECD (2005), p. 119 
93 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007b) and U.S. CBP (2008b 
94 Cf. Springer Transport Media GmbH (2008) 
95 Cf. U.S. CBP (2003) 
96 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004a), p. 3 
97 Cf. U.S. CBP (2003) 
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The following 14 data elements must be sent to CBP:98 
 Foreign port of departure 
 Carrier’s Standard Carrier Alpha Code (SCAC) 
 Voyage number 
 Date of scheduled arrival 
 Numbers and quantities from the carrier’s bills of lading 
 First port of receipt of goods 
 Precise description of the goods and/or Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
United States (HTSUS) code99 
 Shipper’s complete name and address or identity number 
 Consignee’s name and address or identity number 
 Vessel name, national flag and vessel number 
 Foreign port where the cargo was laden on board 
 Hazardous material indicator, if applicable 
 Container number 
 Seal number affixed to the container. 
 
The data is being sent through the Automated Manifest System (AMS) interface.100 
All shipments are then being controlled by the Automated Targeting System (ATS) that 
has predefined criteria of what is considered risky and what is not risky. Only the 
containers that have been identified as risky are then being controlled further. The safe 
shipments are being processed faster and more effectively into the U.S. thanks to this 
program.101 
If companies are not compliant with this rule, it leads to a denial of the shipment at the 
U.S. port of entry and they might be charged a fee.102 
The idea of the 24-hour rule is prevention rather than inspection. Although the costs of 
the initial investment are high, the cost savings on the long run are much higher. The 
pre-identification and targeting of high-risk containers is much more cost effective and 
time saving than random controls.103 
This 24-hour rule is the very first model in this area of security and it has been 
continuously improved. The newer version, the so-called Importer Security Filing and 
Additional Carrier Requirements, will be discussed next. 
3.1.2.3 Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements 
The Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements (ISF), also known as 
                                               
98 Cf. Kommerskollegium (2008), p. 39 
99 The HTSUS code is a duty/statistical reporting number that classifies the goods contained in 
the shipment. For more details see http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-27048.pdf. 
100 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004a), p. 5 
101 Cf. OECD (2005), p. 119 
102 Cf. Kommerskollegium (2008), p. 38 
103 Cf. Bichou (2007), p. 239 
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the “10+2 rule”, is, as already mentioned, an intensification of the already existing 24-
Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule to improve the U.S. customs authority’s ability to 
identify high risk containers. The rule took effect end of January 2009, but there is a 12-
months period where CBP shows restraint from enforcing it in case importers and 
shippers try to comply, but face difficulties in achieving it.104  
ISF requires 10 additional data elements from the importer and 2 additional data 
elements from the carrier, hence its name “10+2 rule”.  
 
The importer security filing includes information about:105  
 seller  
 buyer  
 importer of record number/foreign trade zone applicant identification number  
 consignee number(s)  
 manufacturer/supplier  
 ship to party  
 country of origin 
 commodity HTSUS code 
 container stuffing location and 
 consolidator (stuffer). 
  
The carrier is required to provide:106 
 vessel stow plan and 
 container status messages (CSM). 
  
The vessel stow plan information gathered from the carrier is very helpful for CBP in 
targeting not pre-registered containers and in locating high-risk containers aboard the 
ship in case they need to be discharged.107 The required data includes vessel name, 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) number, vessel operator and voyage number 
as well as the container’s operator name, equipment number, equipment size and type, 
stow position, Hazmat code108 (if applicable), port of landing and port of discharge.109 
Container status messages are used to identify the current position of containers all 
along the supply chain.110 For transit cargo there are even more data elements 
required.111 
The CBP currently uses following approved electronic data interchange systems for 
                                               
104 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 1 and U.S. DHS (2008a) 
105 Cf. U.S. DHS (2008a) and Chertoff (2008), p. 5 
106 Cf. U.S. DHS (2008a) and U.S. DHS (2008c) 
107 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 3 
108 The Hazmat code is an identification number that categorizes hazardous material. For more 
details see http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-27048.pdf.  
109 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 2 and Chertoff (2008), p. 4 
110 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 3 
111 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009a) and U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 3 
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Importer Security Filings: Automated Manifest System (AMS) and Automated Broker 
Interface (ABI). For vessel stow plans CBP uses AMS, secure file transfer protocol 
(sFTP) and e-mail and for container status messages sFTP.112  
 
There is discontent in the industry about the deepness of those required information 
elements and many companies are concerned about their privacy. That is where the 
Secure Freight Initiative comes into play. 
3.1.2.4 Secure Freight Initiative 
The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) builds on existing port security programs and seeks 
to prevent terrorist attacks along the global maritime supply chain using nuclear or 
other radiological materials or bringing the necessary resources for such an attack to 
the United States through cargo containers.113 It was launched on December 7, 2006 to 
“meet the needs for enhanced cargo scanning and expanded integration of trade data 
with government information systems”.114 The idea of SFI is a network that connects 
information from all over the world building a secure ring that no terrorists can intrude. 
To ensure its success DHS, the Department of Energy and the Department of State 
cooperate.115 Moreover, there are coalitions with terminal operators, ocean carriers and 
shippers who are committed to supply chain security.116 
SFI builds on CSI and the Megaports Initiative.117 The Megaports Initiative provides 
countries with radiation detection equipment and in return the United States receives 
information about any findings during the screening process of cargo in the foreign 
ports.118 As far as CSI is concerned both non-intrusive radiographic imaging as well as 
passive radiation detection equipment is used to inspect containers.119 A prerequisite 
for participating in the SFI is participation in CSI and Megaports.120 
Under SFI more containers are examined than just those that are identified as high-risk 
under CSI121 and the ultimate goal is a 100% screening of U.S.-bound cargo 
containers. SFI is currently testing the feasibility of the planned 100% screening in 
seven test ports.122  
 
                                               
112 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 3 
113 Cf. U.S. DHS (2006a) 
114 U.S. CBP (2007c) 
115 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007c) 
116 Cf. U.S. DHS (2006a) and U.S. DHS (2006b) 
117 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007c) and U.S. CBP (2007d) 
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119 Cf. U.S. DHS (2006a), U.S. CBP (2007g), p. 2 and U.S. CBP (2007k), p. 1 
120 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007d), p. 2 
121 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007f) 
122 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007d), p. 1 
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The current SFI ports are:123 
 Port Qasim in Pakistan* 
 Puerto Cortes in Honduras* 
 Port of Southampton in the United Kingdom* 
 Port Salalah in Oman 
 Port of Singapore 
 Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in Korea and 
 Port of Hong Kong. 
 
*The first three listed ports have SFI completely implemented whereas the last four 
ports run on a limited capacity basis.124 
Part of SFI is also dealing with securing data security as well as privacy. To achieve this 
goal, standard file formats are being used as well as data transfer protocols and secure 
submission interfaces within CBP’s Automated Commercial System (ACS) and 
Automated Targeting System (ATS).125 
3.1.3 U.S. air security initiatives 
The aviation industry plays a major role in the U.S. economy. Due to the long distances 
between cities, air is a very popular mode of transportation for commercial cargo within 
the United States. The goods that are being shipped by air are mostly in smaller units 
and not in containers that make up the majority of sea shipments. 
3.1.3.1 Air Automated Manifest System 
The Air Automated Manifest System, also referred to as the Air AMS, is the same 
program for air transportation as the 24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule is for 
maritime shipments. It has been in effect since December 2004126 and requires 
inbound air carriers to provide U.S. Customs with information about the incoming 
shipment electronically 4 hours prior to arrival in the U.S. The rule also applies when 
loaded aircraft have technical stops on U.S. ground.127  
Obligatory information includes:128 
 Shipper’s name and address 
 Name and address of the consignee or owner 
 Precise description of the cargo in English including its weight and value and 
 Quantity reported in the smallest external packing unit. 
 
                                               
123 Cf. U.S. DHS (2006b), U.S. CBP (2007e) and U.S. CBP (2008i) 
124 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007g), p. 1 
125 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008c), p. 3 
126 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004d), p. 7 and O'Toole (2004) 
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In case of non-consolidated shipments, information for the air bill of lading record must 
be transmitted. For consolidated shipments that have a master bill of lading, 
information for every associated house bill of lading must be transmitted when no other 
party has provided CBP with it.129 
Every incoming air carrier with commercial cargo aboard is required to provide 
information in order to be allowed to enter. The importer or customs broker can 
voluntarily add additional information.130 
Non-compliance could result in delays and/or penalties. In the worst case CBP could 
even seize the goods.131 
3.1.3.2 Physical screening of air cargo 
The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ensures the security of cargo 
placed aboard airplanes, in particular on airplanes carrying passengers. As of today, 
half of the cargo transported by passenger carrying planes undergoes screening. 96% 
of the flights originating in the United States have 100% screened cargo on board.132  
Also enhanced background checks of employees and shippers are being executed. 
There are plans for increasing the physical inspections by using new equipment.133  
The development of screening technologies, however, is hindered by the volume, the 
size and timely need of cargo. In the near future, integrating cargo within checked 
baggage areas and the usage of baggage screening explosives detection systems are 
possible inspection methods.134 One major milestone was achieved in October 2008; 
100% of all cargo transported on single-aisle aircraft started to be screened. This was 
achieved by TSA in strong collaboration with air carriers and other members of the air 
cargo industry.135 
3.1.4 U.S. rail security initiative 
The Rail Automated Manifest System is also called Rail AMS and requires rail carriers 
to transmit electronic information about the bills on a train including the standing car 
order to CBP. This must be done the latest one hour before reaching the border. Border 
processing is being expedited thanks to the automated Line Release system. With the 
help of this system the rail carrier electronically transmits a code to customs prior to 
arriving at the border. CBP sends an entry number and the entry status back to the 
carrier and if no further inspection is needed, the train can cross the border 
                                               
129 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004d), p. 10 and U.S. CBP (2005c) 
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132 Cf. Transportation Security Administration (2009) 
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immediately.136 
3.1.5 Other U.S. security initiatives 
The following initiatives are on a voluntary basis. Yet, practitioners claim that the 
market requires it and non-compliance usually results in loss of clients. 
Being involved in those programs is considered as a sign of professionalism and 
strengthens the company’s name. 
Both mentioned programs were initiated by the U.S. Customs Authority CBP. 
3.1.5.1 Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism  
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is an initiative that involves the 
government as well as businesses in pursuing its goal of a secure U.S. border as well 
as international supply chain while expediting the general trade flow. This global supply 
chain security program works on a voluntary basis137 and was first introduced in 
November 2001 as an immediate answer to the terror attacks of New York and 
Washington DC.138 Figure 9 presents C-TPAT’s logo. 
 
Figure 9 Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
 
(Source: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_overview.xml) 
 
The program was developed because the highest level of cargo security can only be 
ensured through intensive cooperation with every single agent in the international 
supply chain including importers, carriers, terminal operators, consolidators, customs 
brokers and manufacturers. Only with communication between all those parties in the 
supply chain about security guidelines and practices C-TPAT’s goal can be reached.139 
And to prevent terrorism in the future it is not enough anymore to only improve security 
at borders and ports of entries.140 
In order to become a C-TPAT member CBP looks at the company’s past customs 
compliance history as well as its Security Profile.141 The Security Profile, also referred 
to as Security Questionnaire, is a comprehensive self assessment of the company’s 
                                               
136 Cf. U.S. CBP (2009m) 
137 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007h) 
138 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004b), p. 2 
139 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007h) 
140 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004b), p. 10 
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security practices.142 It covers a broad spectrum of areas addressing personnel, 
physical and procedural security, education, training and awareness, access controls, 
manifest procedures, conveyance security and documentation processing.143 A major 
hurdle for companies applying for C-TPAT membership involves their supply chain 
partners. Just as the applicant must successfully fill all criteria, each company within 
the applicant’s supply chain must also qualify under C-TPAT’s regulations. In case of 
one partner being considered risky, the C-TPAT certification is put to a hold and the 
questioned business partner undergoes a detailed inspection. If the company in 
question does not increase its security standards, the C-TPAT certified company is 
required to look for a more compliant partner.144 Thus, security levels of thousands of 
companies all over the world were improved through their participation in the supply 
chain of C-TPAT partner companies145. C-TPAT is explicitly focused on importers and 
the prerequisites for a successful application are much more stringent for them. It is 
essential that the complete supply chain can be considered secure and this involves 
many different agents worldwide. The supply chain under consideration reaches back 
to the manufacturer and to the point where the goods are loaded onto a container. The 
process of shipping is the critical process, not the actual manufacturing of the products. 
It is essential that no stranger adds a dangerous item while loading. So-called 
container checklists help dock associates to check for any abnormal events during the 
loading process. Also tampering during transit must be prevented.146 
 
In this context it should be mentioned that most C-TPAT members are companies 
operating in the U.S.147 According to CBP’s website open enrolment is for the following 
business types available:148 
 U.S. Importers of record  
 U.S./Canada Highway Carriers  
 U.S./Mexico Highway Carriers  
 Rail Carriers  
 Sea Carriers  
 Air Carriers  
 U.S. Marine Port Authority/Terminal Operators  
 U.S. Air Freight Consolidators, Ocean Transportation Intermediaries and Non-
Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCC)  
 Mexican and Canadian Manufacturers  
 Certain Invited Foreign Manufacturers  
 Licensed U.S. Customs Brokers  
                                               
142 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008d) 
143 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007i) and U.S. CBP (2004b), p. 12 
144 Cf. interview with Ralf Pfeufer 
145 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004b), p. 12 
146 Cf. interview with Ralf Pfeufer 
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 Third Party Logistics Providers (3PL)  
 Long Haul Highway Carriers in Mexico. 
 
It is very difficult for overseas companies and their business partners to meet all 
necessary security requirements within their entire supply chain. 
Once the application is submitted, a C-TPAT Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS) 
and one or more company representatives will work together to conduct an on-site 
validation.149  
A C-TPAT certified company profits in several ways. There are less border delays due 
to access to FAST lanes as well as fewer CBP inspections and C-TPAT members also 
benefit from front of the line processing in case of inspections. They are more likely 
eligible for the Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) program as well as have priority access 
to participate in ACE. Furthermore, they are assigned an SCSS to support them and 
are able to attend C-TPAT supply chain security training seminars.150 CBP lists some 
additional benefits for companies resulting from a C-TPAT membership:151 
 Good security practices and procedures that are incorporated into existing 
logistical management methods and processes 
 Better supply chain integrity 
 Reduced risk mitigation 
 Reduced cargo theft 
 Stronger brand equity 
 Improved asset utilization 
 Higher security for the workforce 
 Better marketability 
 Better understanding of the process and knowing each agent along the supply 
chain. 
 
Moreover, C-TPAT provides a platform of knowledge, ideas and best practices 
accessible for all members.152 
When C-TPAT first started in late 2001 there were only 7 members.153 As of the end of 
December 2008, C-TPAT performed over 8,000 validations.154  
And the initiative continuously improves and develops further. Even businesses have 
added valuable points during meetings which CBP first did not think of. The fact that C-
TPAT is a flexible program makes it easy to make ongoing amendments.155 Initially the 
focus was on specific areas along the supply chain, but now C-TPAT’s scope includes 
manufacturing sites, foreign ports and logistics providers as well as IT and workplace 
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security.156 
3.1.5.2 Importer Self-Assessment 
The Importer Self-Assessment (ISA) is a voluntary program between CBP and 
companies with the aim of facilitating trade and strengthen compliance by reducing 
required resources during entry and afterwards.157 ISA started in June 2002158 and is a 
partnership dealing with trade compliance, whereas C-TPAT is a partnership about 
supply chain security.159 This initiative is build on knowledge, trust and an ongoing 
CBP/importer relationship.160  
Importers must have implemented internal control procedures of certain risk areas and 
must provide CBP with business records that show the accuracy of CBP 
transactions.161 In return, CBP must inform the importer of his rights and responsibilities 
under the law.162 While companies take on responsibility and try to be compliant with 
CBP’s requirements, CBP reduces its control over the participating companies.163  
Figure 10 shows ISA’s five different internal control components:164 
 
Figure 10 ISA’s internal control components 
 
 
 
(Source: Own creation after 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/trade_programs/importer_self_assessment/c_tpat_seminar.ctt/c
_tpat_seminar.pdf) 
 
The Control Environment is the foundation and provides structure and discipline.165 
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Risk Assessment identifies different problems166 and then Control Activities like 
policies, procedures or techniques ensure the proper execution of set tasks.167 The 
fourth component, Information & Communication, is a support for all other components 
and ensures that information is gathered and communicated to the right people, in 
adequate detail, on time and in the appropriate form.168 The last component Monitoring 
assesses the performance of the internal control including its design and operation. If 
necessary, corrections can be made.169  
Requirements for participation in ISA are C-TPAT membership, completion of an ISA 
questionnaire and signing an ISA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Furthermore, 
the company’s agreement is required to periodically test performance and comply with 
all CBP rules and regulations.170 
Benefits from a participation in ISA are exemption from most CBP intrusion, reduced 
auditing, more accurate data and more company control over the process.171 
3.2 Canada’s security programs 
Canada’s transportation system has always been one of the safest and most secure in 
the world. The two most important government authorities dealing with the security 
programs are Transport Canada and Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). They 
have a high collaboration with other governments, industries and international 
organisations like the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).172 
Now the most important programs will be described more into detail. 
3.2.1 Canadian road security initiatives 
There are several security initiatives concerning the shipment of goods by trucks. 
Mostly the Pre-Arrival Review System (PARS) that is used to transmit the 
information173, which can be compared to the U.S. PAPS. 
Listed below are the most common road security programs. 
                                                                                                                                         
165 Cf. U.S. CBP (2008f), p. 8 
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3.2.1.1 EManifest for road carriers 
Canada developed the Advance Commercial Information (ACI) program to provide 
CBSA with electronic pre-arrival cargo information, just like the U.S. CBP developed 
the Automated Manifest System (AMS). The eManifest for road carriers covers the area 
of road transportation and is comparable to the U.S. Electronic Truck Manifest as 
described in chapter 3.1.1.2.  
Its implementation is planned for spring 2010 and it is Phase 3 of Canada’s whole ACI 
program.174 Advance cargo and conveyance information will be required one hour prior 
to arrival at the border by all carriers of highway shipments.175 Furthermore, the 
eManifest will require advance secondary data from freight forwarders as well as 
importer data from importers and/or brokers.176 
3.2.1.2 Customs Self Assessment Program 
The Customs Self Assessment (CSA) program needs pre-approval of importers, 
carriers and drivers and if they are considered low-risk they profit from facilitated and 
more efficient processing at the border.177 It also includes a fast accounting and 
payment process for goods imported into Canada.178 
3.2.1.3 The Commercial Driver Registration Program 
The Commercial Driver Registration Program (CDRP) is only for commercial freight 
shipments from the U.S. into Canada. It makes the customs clearance process at the 
border easier and faster for pre-approved importers, carriers and drivers and their low-
risk goods.179  
3.2.1.4 Free and Secure Trade 
Similar to the FAST program described under the U.S. road security initiatives the 
Canadian FAST program gives pre-registered, trusted truck drivers the possibility of 
expedited border crossing through designated FAST lanes. For carriers from the one 
side of the border a Partnership in Protection (PIP) membership is required, for the 
other side a C-TPAT certification is necessary to become FAST certified.180 
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3.2.2 Canada’s maritime security initiatives 
Marine trade is vital for Canada’s economy. One quarter of Canada’s total worth of 
goods is being handled by Canadian ports and its port authorities.181 
In Canada there is a high collaboration of the different government institutions to meet 
compliance with the international security regulations. Transport Canada, Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)/Canadian Coast Guards, Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness Canada, CBSA, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the 
Department of National Defence all work together on the maritime cargo security and 
terrorism prevention. The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (IMSWG) 
was founded by the Canadian Government to coordinate this collaboration.182 
After the international ISPS code was implemented, the Marine Transportation Security 
Regulations (MTSRs) were developed to be compliant with ISPS’s security 
requirements. In order to fund those new requirements Canada started the Marine 
Security Contribution Program (MSCP). The Canadian government committed itself to 
provide ports, port facilities and ferry operators with funding as well as assistance to 
meet the necessary security requirements.183 Canada port authorities can reimburse 
certain security related and pre-identified expenses for the period of April 2004 to 
November 2009, marine facilities are eligible for expenses between April 2004 and 
November 2009 and domestic ferry services from June 2006 to November 2009.184  
3.2.2.1 Marine Transportation Security Clearance Program 
The above mentioned MTSRs include requirements for security clearance for marine 
workers. Therefore the Marine Transportation Security Clearance Program (MTSCP) 
was developed. It uses background checks on marine workers, marine pilots, security 
personnel and seafarers in order to reduce the risk of security threats through 
intervention inside the marine supply chain itself.185 It was introduced in January 2003 
and is an expansion of the existing Air Transportation Security Clearance Program 
existent since 1985 in the aviation sector.186 
The required personal information elements for the application include:187 
 Fingerprints and photo 
 Full name 
 Date and place of birth 
 Gender, height, weight, eye and hair colour 
 Passport information 
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 Post secondary school education 
 Residential and employment history for the last five years 
 Extended travel (more than 90 days) outside Canada other than to United 
States and Mexico and 
 Some information about the applicant’s spouse. 
 
The background checks are being performed by Transport Canada, RCMP, the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and if required, by Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC).188 
3.2.2.2 Advance Commercial Information Marine Program 
The Advanced Commercial Information Marine program, short ACI Marine program, 
provides CBSA with necessary information about commercial goods before their arrival 
at a port in Canada. It is the counterpart to the U.S. 24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-
Rule as described in chapter 3.1.2.2. Marine carriers have to electronically submit 
cargo information to CBSA 24 hours before the shipment gets loaded onboard a vessel 
in a foreign port.189 This requirement in the marine mode was implemented in April 
2004 and is also referred to as the ACI Phase 1.190 
The system that is being used is called Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). With the 
help of it clients can electronically submit their trade data.191 
3.2.2.3 Container Security Initiative 
The CBSA signed a CSI partnership agreement with U.S. CBP in October 2005. Thus, 
also Canadian customs officers are placed at foreign CSI ports around the world 
identifying and examining high-risk containers.192 Like the United States, Canada is 
pushing its border out and assessing potential threats long before they enter Canada. 
Other benefits include shared information about possible security threats, high data 
quality that in turn improves CBSA’s overall risk assessment capacity and access to a 
pool of risk management practices and other best practices and lessons learned.193 
CBSA is also trying to motivate other countries to partner with Canada on container 
security to reach an even higher level security and trade facilitation in the future.194 
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3.2.3 Canadian air security initiative 
The Advanced Commercial Information Air program is also called Phase 2 and it was 
implemented in July 2006. With the so-called ACI Air program air carriers and freight 
forwarders have to provide CBSA electronically with information about conveyance and 
cargo four hours prior to arrival in Canada.195 
3.2.4 Canadian rail security initiatives 
The border between the United States and Canada processes over 100 miles of rail 
freight on a daily basis and this number is predicted to be rising in the near future.196 
The following two initiatives need to be mentioned as far as Canadian rail security 
programs are concerned. 
3.2.4.1 Memorandum of Understanding on rail security 
With the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on rail security Transport Canada 
together with the Railway Association of Canada tries to ensure the security of freight 
rail with a set of different measures. Those measures include the preparation of a risk 
assessment based security plan, incident reports, records maintenance, trainings and 
exercises and awareness for new employees. Moreover, initiatives improving the 
secure and efficient traffic along key trade corridors are being introduced.197  
3.2.4.2 EManifest for rail carriers 
The eManifest for rail carriers is the last phase of ACI.198 It is scheduled to start in fall 
2010.199 By then all rail carriers will have to electronically transmit advance cargo and 
conveyance data two hours prior to arrival.200 
3.2.5 Other Canadian security initiatives 
3.2.5.1 Importer Admissibility Data 
The Importer Admissibility Data (IAD) filing is one of the many steps in Canada’s ACI 
implementation process. It is scheduled for October 2009 and can be compared to the 
in chapter 3.1.2.3 described U.S. Importer Security Filing System. IAD, however, would 
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apply to all modes of transportation.201 This program is seen controversial by industry 
as it would impact the land borders and would very likely cause delays and disruptions 
along North American supply chains.202 
3.2.5.2 Partnership in Protection 
The Partnership in Protection (PIP) program is a partnership between CBSA and 
private corporations with the goal of improving trade chain and border security, curtail 
organized crime and terrorism and combat contraband smuggling. It was already 
developed in 1995 and its initial goal was to promote business awareness and 
compliance with customs regulations. Its importance dramatically increased after the 
terror attacks in New York in 2001 and its focus shifted. From then on it urged members 
to improve their physical, infrastructure and procedural security to ensure trade chain 
security. A security questionnaire was developed suggesting security 
recommendations. PIP’s importance increased even further when a PIP membership 
became a must for a participation in the FAST program.203  
Appendix 6 provides an example of a carrier’s PIP certification. As PIP members 
companies have to ensure that containers and trailers are properly sealed before they 
are shipped into Canada. CBSA then checks all incoming cargo for the integrity of the 
seals and that the sealing procedures meet CBSA’s standards.204 
3.3 Mexico’s security programs 
Since the enactment of NAFTA, Mexico’s trade with its neighbouring countries has 
more than doubled.205 This stimulated the country’s economic growth, but also 
increased the need for transportation security measures. The Mexican security 
initiatives, however, are not as well developed as the U.S. or Canadian programs.  
As far as the road transportation goes, NAFTA’s idea was to enable the trucking 
industries of the United States and Mexico full access to the whole trade region. Due to 
safety concerns on the U.S. side, however, this was never implemented and Mexico 
responded with restricting cross-border trucking to a narrow commercial zone. Canada 
was granted more access due to a bilateral agreement with Mexico.206  
The Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program (CBIP) is a U.S. fund that is aimed at 
border crossing infrastructure, safety enforcement facilities and electronic data 
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exchange between the countries.207 In Mexico this fund’s money can be used for 
improvements within 100 miles of the U.S. border and only at an international port of 
entry.208  
In form of the U.S.-Mexico Joint Working Committee federal transportation agencies, 
customs agencies, border state transportation agencies as well as immigration of both 
countries continuously meet and collaborate on transportation issues.209 In the 
following chapters an overview about existing programs will be given. 
3.3.1 Mexican road security initiatives 
A big portion of the trade between Mexico and the U.S. is moved by truck210 with an 
increasing trend for the future. Thus, security initiatives concerning this mode of 
transportation are of utmost importance. In the past millions of dollar were lost every 
year due to the fact that Mexican trucks were not allowed into the U.S. and had to be 
transferred and vice versa.211 
There were high restrictions on how Mexican trucks can operate beyond the border 
commercial zone. The result was a kind of corridor along the border where so-called 
drayage carriers pick up the loaded trailers and bring them to the international ports of 
entry.212 That is where the Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program came into 
play. 
3.3.1.1 Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program 
Through the Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program U.S. trucking companies 
can now make deliveries into Mexico and Mexican truck drivers can drive into the U.S. 
while keeping the tough security measures. Thanks to this program the speed of actual 
delivery of goods increased enormously as the waiting time at the border was reduced. 
Still there are rigorous, in-person security controls by U.S. inspectors to ensure the 
safe operation of Mexican trucks crossing the border. Mexican truck drivers must hold a 
valid commercial driver’s license, be able to understand basic English as well as be 
medically fit. If they comply with all those regulations and they have insurance with a 
U.S. licensed firm, they are able to start transporting goods across the border. In 
exchange, U.S. trucking firms are required to have a license to be allowed to operate in 
Mexico.213 
The Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program provides the agents with a 
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checklist with altogether 37 points to inspect including the truck, trailer and the driver.214 
3.3.1.2 Free And Secure Trade 
Like Canada also Mexico agreed on a partnership with the U.S. on the Free And 
Secure Trade (FAST) program. Thus, waiting times for trusted shippers could be 
reduced to a couple of minutes in comparison to hours before its introduction.215 As 
already mentioned before, companies must be C-TPAT certified in order to be able to 
participate in FAST.216 
3.3.2 Mexican maritime security initiatives 
With November 1, 2007 also Mexico introduced its own 24 hours Advance Cargo 
Manifest Rule requiring freight forwarder to submit their bill of lading to Mexico 
Customs for all cargo entering Mexico. Unlike the U.S. AMS and the Canadian ACI, 
there is no direct link to Mexico Customs and thus the bill of ladings must be filed using 
Mexican trade associations like Asociacion Mexicana de Agentes Navieros, A.C. 
(AMANAC) or Asociacion Mexicana de Agentes de Carga, A.C. (AMACARGA).217 
A so-called Harmonized Alpha Numeric Carrier Code that is issued by Mexico Customs’ 
General Customs Administration is required. This code, however, is only issued to 
Mexican companies or to the Mexican agents of foreign companies.218   
The same regulations apply if the cargo is just in transit in Mexico.219 
 
In 2006 a study was considering the possibility of transferring some of the land cargo 
traffic to short shipping routes in the Gulf of Mexico. This would decrease costs as well 
as long waiting times at the border.220 As of today, however, this program has not been 
implemented.  
3.3.3 Mexican air security initiatives 
Similar to the above mentioned 24 hours Advance Cargo Manifest Rule for ocean 
carriers, Mexico Customs is working on the Mexico Advanced Cargo Requirements for 
air carriers. For flights coming from either the United States or Canada the required 
information must be sent at the time of departure at the last foreign airport before 
                                               
214 Cf. U.S. Department of Transportation (2007b) 
215 Cf. Hochman (2005) 
216 Cf. Villa (2005), p. 1 
217 Cf. Hanjin Logistics Co. Ltd. (2007), p. 1 
218 Cf. Hanjin Logistics Co. Ltd. (2007), p. 1 
219 Cf. APL Ltd. (2007) 
220 Cf. Texas Transportation Institute (2006) 
  40 
entering Mexico. A test phase started as of mid-August 2009.221 
3.3.4 Mexican rail security initiatives 
So far there are no specific security programs in place to address rail transportation in 
Mexico. Rail carriers and the loaded cargo do, however, have to go through customs. 
In order for Mexico Customs to clear a train going into Mexico, the following information 
needs to be provided to them:222 
 Name of Mexican customs broker 
 City and state of destination 
 If available the address of the broker. 
Any missing information may lead to delays and/or charges.223 
Since the privatization of the Mexican rail in the 1990s, the infrastructure has improved 
significantly and offers multi-modal links between the United States as well as Canada 
including inter-modal facilities.224 
3.4 Private cooperation initiatives 
There are also initiatives that were initiated by companies and their industry partners. 
Those collaborative programs predominantly seek to reduce terrorism, smuggling and 
theft of goods. Private businesses combine their efforts to share experiences and 
knowledge and develop strategies for improved security.  
3.4.1 Business Alliance for Secure Commerce 
The Business Alliance for Secure Commerce (BASC) is a coalition of private sector 
businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean with the goal of improving supply chain 
security. It is based on collaboration with the countries’ government agencies as well as 
international organizations and was first established in 1996. It operates in Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, the 
Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay.225 The countries Brazil, Argentina, Chile and 
Nicaragua are currently in the application process.226 
Membership is on a voluntary basis and the incentive is meant to be consciousness for 
security issues throughout the supply chain. With certain security standards and 
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processes in place, companies should prevent contraband smuggling and terrorism.227 
3.4.2 Transported Asset Protection Association 
Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) is a worldwide association of 
companies created to collaboratively address the threat of cargo theft. It was initiated in 
the United States in particular to protect highly valuable goods, mostly high technology 
goods in transit. The number of incidents of freight theft increased enormously since 
the 1990s with the products becoming smaller and more portable.228 
Big freight forwarders realise a competitive advantage with a TAPA certification in 
contrast to a competitor who is not certified. A significant cost savings is realized 
through insurance companies that offer better rates to companies that are TAPA 
certified.229 
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4 Analysis of the security initiatives’ impact on 
NAFTA trade 
In this chapter the author wants to analyze the existing cargo security programs and 
their advantages and disadvantages for the overall trade flow as well as for individual 
companies. The chapter will start with a comparison of the different initiatives followed 
by an analysis on an economic level. The author takes a look at the existing 
cooperation between the three NAFTA partners as well as the cooperation within the 
individual countries’ government departments and institutions. Furthermore, the 
initiatives’ impact on the overall trade in North America is shown. In the business 
analysis practical insight obtained through interviews with logistic providers as well as 
carriers will be given. The programs’ benefits and costs are presented as well as their 
marketing value. Additionally the question if the initiatives are trade facilitating or trade 
hindering is being answered. 
4.1 Comparison of the different initiatives 
When looking at the North American security initiatives that are currently in use it is 
interesting that the U.S. programs greatly outnumber the Canadian as well as the 
Mexican programs. Two arguments can be used to explain this situation. One is that 
the U.S. security came under much greater scrutiny after the terror attacks of 9/11. The 
major factor could be the United States’ geographical and population size together with 
its large trade volume. Canada is the second largest land mass on earth, but 
population wise it is only a tenth of the United States. Mexico has only about a third of 
the U.S. population and its trade volume is minimal in comparison to its larger northern 
neighbour. It is without any doubt visible that the United States invests the most time, 
money and effort into the topic of security of the three NAFTA partners. Canada follows 
the U.S., in particular with any programs that help to expedite cross-border processing 
and facilitate trade. Mexico is last on the list and is only slowly starting to develop 
similar programs. As most trade is going north out of Mexico the focus is 
understandingly not on imports into Mexico.  
In chapter 3 all security programs were categorized by country. Now the author wants 
to look at them from different perspectives. 
Figure 11 shows a timeline of the introduction of the most relevant security initiatives. 
Mexican programs are not comprised as this graph only includes the most relevant 
programs in terms of the whole trade community. 
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Figure 11 Timeline of introduction of different security programs 
 
(Source: Own creation) 
 
There are two interesting facts about this timeline that need to be highlighted. First, the 
high concentration of program introductions in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 clearly 
reflects the United States’ reaction to the terror attacks of New York and Washington, 
D.C. on September 11, 2001. Those events showed America, its government and 
institutions and its people how easily the country can be intruded and harmed. It 
increased the awareness of the risk that a mode of transportation can be misused to 
cause harm to people and disruptions to transportation and supply chains. Cargo 
containers were identified as particularly risky for being illegally loaded with bombs or 
WMD’s. DHS made it its first goal to protect the United States, its people, businesses, 
transportation and supply chains and critical infrastructure. A line of priorities can be 
found within this timeline. The first program introduced by the United States was C-
TPAT, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. As the name itself describes, 
this supply chain wide program intends to curtail any potential terrorist activities 
towards the United States right from the beginning of the transportation chain. This 
increases security within its neighbouring countries and throughout the trade 
community down to its roots, to the people and facilities involved. The ultimate goal 
being trust and security among the global trade community, made C-TPAT priority 
number one for the United States. The next important step was the physical controls of 
cargo coming from non C-TPAT certified companies or cargo that is considered 
dangerous. In 2002 CSI, the Container Security Initiative was introduced. This program 
started X-ray, screening and radiation inspections on cargo containers entering the 
United States. The third priority can also be seen as a facilitation of the introduced 
programs. It involves the pre-identification of risky cargo before their arrival at a U.S. 
port of entry. The possibility of identifying potential dangerous cargo beforehand and 
reducing the number of physical inspections at borders to certain identified containers 
or trucks makes the whole process much faster and more efficient. Cargo that is 
considered secure then benefits from an expedited border processing. 
The second interesting matter is that Canada was far ahead of the security and 
compliance trend through the introduction of its first security initiative in 1995. PIP, the 
Partnership in Protection, can be compared to the U.S. C-TPAT and certifies 
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trustworthy business partners. Although its initial goal was a different one, it was easily 
expanded to help the Canadian government address the security issue. 
 
Now a comparison of the existing advanced cargo information requirements in North 
America will be given. When comparing the advanced cargo manifest regulations of the 
United States and Canada a lot of similarities can be found. While it is called 
Automated Manifest System (AMS) in the U.S., the Canadian government named their 
advanced cargo information program Advanced Commercial Information (ACI). Mexico 
basically copied the U.S. names for the programs it developed. Table 5 provides an 
overview of the advanced cargo manifest programs that are currently in use. 
 
Table 5 Overview of Advance Cargo Information Programs in the United States and Mexico 
Mode of 
Transportation 
United States Canada Mexico 
Road e-manifest eManifest n/a 
Sea 24-Hour-Advance-
Vessel-Manifest-
Rule 
ACI Marine program Mexico 24 hours 
Advance Cargo 
Manifest Rule 
Air Air AMS ACI Air program Mexico 
Advanced Cargo 
Requirements 
for Air Carriers 
Rail Rail AMS eManifest for rail 
carriers 
n/a 
(Source: Own creation) 
 
As far as the electronic truck manifest is concerned, there is a slight difference between 
the U.S. and Canada. Both countries require advanced information one hour before the 
truck drivers arrives at the border. A special rule applies to FAST member that are 
going into the United States. They only need to submit the information to CBP half an 
hour before their arrival. As of today the Mexican government does not require any 
advanced information about the goods and their status. They do, however, have to go 
through Mexican customs.  
The significant difference between the U.S., Canadian and Mexican 24-hour rule for 
sea cargo was already mentioned in chapter 3.3.2. Mexico Customs does not provide 
an IT system that directly links to them. Thus, Mexican trade associations must be used 
to complete the filing. 
While the U.S. Air AMS as well as the Canadian ACI Air program both require the cargo 
information four hours prior to arrival, Mexico wants the information to be sent at the 
time of departure at the last foreign airport. Depending on where the last airport is 
situated in the U.S. or Canada this time span can exceed four hours, but it can also be 
less than that. 
When shipping cargo via rail, carriers crossing the border into Canada have to submit 
the data two hours prior to arrival, whereas the U.S. customs authority wants 
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respective information only one hour before arriving at the U.S. border. 
 
Another interesting area to look at is the controversial expansion of the U.S. 24-hour 
rule to the so-called 10+2 rule. Table 6 compares the existing carrier requirements with 
the new carrier requirements that were implemented with the 10+2 rule. 
 
Table 6 Comparison of existing carrier requirements versus new carrier requirements 
 Existing Requirements New Requirements 
Requirement Advance Cargo Information Stow Plan Container Status Messages 
Timing 24 hours prior to loading 48 hours after departure and 
earlier if voyage is less than 
48 hours 
24 hours after entering the 
message into the carrier’s 
equipment tracking system 
Submission 
Method 
Vessel AMS Vessel AMS, sFTP or email sFTP 
Submission 
Elements 
- Bill of Lading 
- Foreign departure port 
- Carrier SCAC 
- Carrier assigned voyage   
  number 
- Date of arrival at U.S. port 
- Quantity and unit of measure 
- Commodity description or  
  HTSUS number 
- Commodity weight 
- Shipper’s name and address 
- Consignee name and  
  address 
- Vessel name, number and  
  country 
- Foreign port of lading 
- Hazmat Code 
- Container numbers 
- Seal numbers 
- Date and time of departure  
  from foreign port 
- Vessel name including IMO  
  number 
- Vessel operator 
- Voyage number 
- Container operator 
- Equipment number 
- Equipment size and type 
- Stow position 
- Hazmat Code 
- Port of lading 
- Port of discharge 
- Container number 
- Event code being reported 
- Date and time of the event 
- Status of the container  
  (empty or full) 
- Location where the event  
  took place 
- Vessel identification  
  associated with the message    
  if the container is associated  
  with a specific vessel 
(Source: Own creation after http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-27048.pdf) 
 
The new 10+2 rule adds another level that makes it possible to identify and track any 
tampering or other impacts a freight containers experiences during transit. The 
Container Status Messages make it simpler for customs officers to identify which 
containers should be chosen for a secondary inspection.230 
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4.2 Analysis of the security initiatives on a macro level 
The following chapter talks about existing cooperation between the NAFTA partners on 
security initiatives and the impact they have on trade in North America. Chapter 4.2.2 
talks about long border wait times, increasing fees, changing operating processes and 
the missing of promised benefits for participants.  
4.2.1 Working together across the borders 
As a big step towards global collaboration, the World Customs Organization (WCO) 
introduced the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE), 
also called WCO’s Framework, in 2005. Through safeguarding the security from the 
beginning till the end of a supply chain and by facilitating the processing of legitimate 
cargo through customs controls, SAFE wants to reach uniformity and predictability of 
global trade.231 The WCO has currently 174 members232 representing 99% of global 
trade. Having the participation of the member countries’ customs administrations is a 
very strong instrument in the battle of implementing the WCO standards worldwide.233 
The framework’s objectives are:234 
 Establishment of standards that ensure supply chain security and facilitate 
international trade. 
 Integrated supply chain management for all modes of transportation. 
 Enhanced capabilities of customs authorities to meet today’s challenges and 
opportunities. 
 Strengthened network between customs administrations in order to better 
detect high-risk consignments. 
 Promotion of cooperation between the customs and business communities. 
 And defend seamless movement of cargo through secure global trade supply 
chains. 
 
It is a Customs-to-Customs as well as a Customs-to-Business partnership235 and builds 
on the four principles: Advance electronic information, risk management, outbound 
inspection and partnerships.236 
 
Whereas the WCO SAFE Framework involves the whole world, there is also 
collaboration between NAFTA countries, their government institutions and companies. 
North America is a success story as far as integrated transportation systems and 
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efficient continental supply chains go. The United States, Canada and Mexico 
continuously collaborate trilaterally to enhance security along the supply chains and 
facilitate trade.237 The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) tries 
to promote the security as well as prosperity of the three NAFTA members.238 It 
developed a framework that does not only allow bilateral action on border issues, but 
also private sector input from the three North American countries. The businesses are 
represented in the form of the North American Competitiveness Council (NACC).239 A 
strong collaboration exists between the business leaders and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and Council of the Americas in the United States, the Canadian Council of 
Chief Executives in Canada and the Mexican Instituto para la Competitividad.240 
In the following chapters existing cooperation within programs across the United 
States, Canada and Mexico is being discussed.  
4.2.1.1 Cooperation on security initiatives  
Cooperation is a key driver of success and prosperity in the competitive business world 
of today. The North American countries United States, Canada and Mexico have a long 
history of collaboration. They also work together on border security related issues, for 
cargo shipments as well as for passenger travels. And there is not only cooperation 
between the three NAFTA countries, but also within the individual countries’ own 
government agencies and departments. 
Yet, the existing cooperation is still a complex matrix of differing policies and priorities 
and many more steps need to be taken by the different governments to improve 
collaboration. 
 
An example for cooperation between the different nations is the FAST program. The 
U.S. C-TPAT administration and Canada’s PIP administration work together to make 
commercial trucking between the two countries faster and smoother. There is a 
common effort to improve the security and efficiency of clearing trucks at the shared 
border and the same risk management principles, screening methods and technology 
are used.241  
Another example is NEXUS, a frequent traveller program. It was collaboratively 
developed by the United States and Canada and uses a single application and 
certification process.242 While NEXUS covers the United States’ northern border, the 
program SENTRI simplifies the border crossing for frequent travellers between the U.S. 
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and Mexico.243 
There is also bilateral collaboration on a regional level. The Washington State in the 
U.S., for example, signed an agreement with the neighbouring Canadian province, 
British Columbia for a bi-national freight border crossing system. This program is 
named International Mobility and Trade Corridor (IMTC) partnership makes expedited 
border clearance and reduced waiting times for the U.S.-Canada trade corridor in the 
west of the continent possible.244 
The CSI program fosters cooperation on a worldwide basis. U.S. customs officers are 
stationed in all CSI certified ports cooperating on-site with the host country officers. 
CBP underlines that information sharing and working together is essential to be able to 
identify all risky containers and a far greater security for maritime shipping can be 
achieved.245 Canada’s CSI ports are in Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax.246 Additionally 
Canada signed a CSI partnership with the U.S. and has its own security officers 
stationed in CSI ports around the world.247 There are no CSI ports in Mexico yet. 
The C-TPAT program involves companies and businesses from around the world. In 
2008, C-TPAT experienced an enhancement when Foreign Port Terminal Operators 
and Mexican Long Haul Carriers where added to the program. Furthermore, CBP 
signed Mutual Recognition Arrangements with CBSA and the Jordan Customs 
Department that both have similar minimum security requirements and practices.248 
And there are plans for further mutual recognition arrangements with other countries for 
the future.249 
 
Also departments and agencies within the individual countries collaborate. 
The Canadian Border Services Agency is working on a Single Window framework that 
should combine all existing border reporting systems under one IT framework.250 In the 
United States, the so-called International Trade Data System (ITDS) project started 
with the intention of combining all existing U.S. filing systems.251 Thanks to a strong 
collaboration within different agencies the ACE system was developed. As of May 
2009, there are 46 government agencies involved.252  
Within the U.S., DHS and the Department of Energy work strongly together in the 
programs SFI and CSI to be able to detect dangerous radiation material. Thanks to this 
collaboration DHS is able to identify possible dangerous cargo.253  
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U.S. senator W. Ralph Basham said in May 2006 that partnership between the 
government and the private sector was the key factor that enabled CBP to implement 
all current initiatives and programs.254  
 
Despite the commitment to collaboration, there are overlaps between different 
programs. To list one example the Canadian MTSCP is mentioned. Canada is planning 
on allowing commercial truck drivers who have a valid FAST card into restricted areas 
as long as they adhere to all of the applicable procedures and requirements identified 
in the approved marine facility security plan.255 
New administration in both the United States and Canada will make it easier to review 
the shared border management and try to find possible improvements. President 
Barack Obama and the U.S. Homeland Security Secretary suggested annual meetings 
of high-level government agents when talking about the shared border issues during 
their visit in Canada early 2009.256 
4.2.1.2 Problems hindering the cooperation 
The biggest factor hindering the cooperation is the individuality of most of the programs 
and initiatives. Every country started its own regulations and systems after the U.S. 
introduced C-TPAT in late 2001. Every implementation involves a lot of effort, work, 
time and money and it takes time until the industry understands the system and is able 
to use it.257  
There are also multiple electronic filing systems that all collect about the same 
information. They all have different formats and are addressed to different institutions. 
Currently, there are four U.S. systems in use and ten Canadian government agencies 
collect similar data.258 No IT systems are in place between Mexico and its two NAFTA 
partners and information exchanges are sometimes still done non-automated.259 It is 
not only time consuming for businesses to learn the different systems and then submit 
information through them, but it is also inefficient. Often companies have to send the 
same information to several different agencies. To combine all those existing systems 
will require a lot of resources and patience and it is difficult for governments as well as 
businesses to sacrifice both in today’s competitive market situation. Yet, a lot of time, 
workforce and money could be saved if there was a single system that the government 
departments could access and pull the information that suits their needs. 
 
Different rules and systems do not only exist between the three countries, but also 
within the countries’ different government departments. In the United States, for 
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example, the border security initiatives are regulated by CBP, but then there is the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulating shipments of food and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) controlling shipments of fruits and animals.260 
Canada has the CBSA for border security issues and the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency (CFIA) for agricultural food shipments. There is no exchange of information 
between those different institutions at all. Moreover, it is standard to inspect every 
single shipment of food products before it crosses the border. So food producers do not 
see a reason why they should spend the money to become a certified member of any 
of the security programs when they will not benefit from any expedited handling due to 
pre-existing food transport regulations. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
Canadian Chamber of Commerce are of the opinion that the danger of any attack 
through food poisoning has to be curtailed far back in the growing and production. Like 
the CSI initiative to secure the whole supply chain, the countries concentrate their 
focus on sophisticated regulatory standards and control processes throughout the food 
production.261 
 
Mexico, its language, culture and economic development adds another level of difficulty 
to the situation. Dissimilar priorities due to cultural and social differences between 
Mexico and the U.S., for example, challenge governmental security agents when trying 
to lay out a plan. Also the government structures are unlike those of Mexico’s northern 
neighbours. Mexico City is a centralized location for all government structures. 
According to Mexican regulations, terrorism is under the federal responsibility making it 
impossible to sign agreements with the U.S. on a regional level. Capacity and resource 
constraints make it impossible to promote border security and cooperation to the 
industry. Missing training and an absence of a long-term planning horizon makes it 
impossible to properly manage the border issues.262 A three year term for local officials 
makes Mexico unable to build expertise, sustain continuity and maintain a good 
relationship with the U.S. counterpart.263 Mexico’s status as a developing nation means 
its resources are scarce for developing a sophisticated trade security regime. 
Furthermore, Mexico faces corruption and a lack of mechanisms for industry 
participation.264 
 
Misunderstanding is another factor that curtails cooperation attempts between Mexico 
and its NAFTA partners. The constantly changing U.S. security regulations make it very 
difficult for Mexican government institutions and companies to follow and fully 
understand them. It is important to support Mexican supply chain partners to minimize 
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the impact on the international trade.265 
 
Industry also mentions privacy as an area of concern. The advanced cargo information 
requirements include detailed information about companies’ practices and if shared 
with competitors the company’s success could be harmed. Thus, questions about 
intellectual property protection need to be asked.266 
4.2.1.3 Harmonization and standardization of existing security 
initiatives 
Many initiatives and programs are similar across the different countries and same 
systems are used for different programs. Thus, there is a huge potential for 
harmonization and standardization of existing initiatives. 
 
The SFI program is a step towards harmonization. It does not only involve several 
government institutions, but also terminal operators, ocean carriers and shippers.267  
Also the FAST is a perfect example of existing harmonized initiatives. The U.S.-
Canadian FAST is a bilateral initiative268 as well as the U.S.-Mexico FAST269. 
 
Under the already mentioned Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, 
$11.6 million in funding was provided by the Government of Canada to strengthen the 
PIP program in order to achieve mutual recognition and compatibility with the U.S. C-
TPAT program. On June 28, 2008, CBSA signed an arrangement with U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection. With mutual recognition only one application and validation 
would be necessary.270 
 
Pfeufer from cargo-partner New York sees a potential for incorporating TSA’s air cargo 
security programs in CBP’s initiatives, like C-TPAT. Both U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security departments have similar programs that are currently operating separately. 
TSA captures certain companies as secure and trustworthy in its database and it would 
be more efficient as well as export oriented if CBP had access to this list.271  
Harmonization on a regional basis would for sure help to make processes easier, in 
particular for companies that operate in multiple countries, thinks Betscha from Exel.272 
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4.2.2 The security initiatives’ effect on trade in North America 
A sense of frustration can be found within North American companies as well as the 
international trade community regarding the fact that most “trade facilitating” programs 
and initiatives did not improve the flow of goods at all. They, in fact, had a hampering 
effect on trade and many measures for improvement have yet to be taken. 
Multiple and complex regulations and rules from different governments and other 
institutions, certain infrastructure requirements, high costs for participation in trusted 
shipper programs, increasing inspections and fees, long waiting times at borders as 
well as charges for non-compliance have made trade in North America more difficult in 
the past years. The original idea of the NAFTA agreement as described in chapter 2.2 
seems to be eroding and the trend goes distinctively in direction of a “thick” border. 
North American governments are so highly focused on securing their country and 
people that they do not consider and involve the trade community. While Europe is 
creating a competitive advantage for itself by integrating its borders, North America’s 
borders seem to be moving away from each other.273  
4.2.2.1 Long border wait times 
At the beginning it should be mentioned that border waiting times –in general- 
increased significantly after the events of 9/11. Thus, even when participating in 
expediting programs like FAST, companies feel that the waiting time has increased.274 
Yet, non-compliance leads to even longer delays. 
 
Although governments and customs agencies promised expedited border crossing 
once a membership in the different security initiatives is being achieved, most 
commercial carriers still experience long waiting times at port of entries. An example is 
truck imports and exports between Canada and the United States early 2009. Truck 
shipments from Canada to the U.S. plummeted 31.3% and shipments entering Canada 
by truck from its southern neighbour dropped 27.2%, but still increased waiting times at 
the border were reported.275  
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce together 
identified the following five factors that lead to increased border waiting times:276 
 Border infrastructure incapable of handling traffic volume 
 Lack of effective technology and handling knowledge 
 Redundant procedures and inspections for trusted shippers 
 Staffing and training constraints and 
 Lack of public education about the latest security developments. 
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Another factor should be added here. When there are, for example, 12 containers on a 
single bill of lading and one is being pulled for inspection, all 12 containers have to wait 
until the one container is ready to be cleared.277 These delays caused by inflexible 
bureaucracy mechanisms lead to enormous costs for companies. 
 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce suggested 
expanding the border back inland to the manufacturing and warehousing facilities. 
According to them, product safety inspections at the origin of the products would 
improve on-time delivery, reduce costs and lead to the relief of traffic congestion at the 
ports of entry.278 The author is of the opinion that this idea misses critical points of 
consideration. First, it is not only the security of the products themselves that is critical 
to supply chain security, but it is the transit process of those goods. While the goods 
are being shipped the trucks or containers could be tampered and dangerous items or 
chemicals could be added. It would not mitigate all risks if the manufacturing and 
warehousing facilities alone undergo controls. Regulations would have to be put into 
place covering the security during the transportation process towards the border 
causing increased bureaucracy, work and costs. Second, a detailed control mechanism 
at the inland production facilities requires new regulatory procedures and new and 
specially trained security staff as well as a government body that continuously controls 
compliance on site. To implement this at every single manufacturing and consolidating 
facility is far too expensive. Thirdly, implementation of strict security inspections in 
plants and factories would also include products that stay within the country’s borders 
causing extra costs that would be avoidable. Often domestic goods only get separated 
from export goods in off-site warehouses. Also consolidation of different producers’ 
products is standard business practice.  
The author does support the idea of moving the actual border facilities back away from 
critical infrastructure like bridges.279 This would make it a safer and due to more space 
and reduced resource constraints, a much faster process. 
 
Another factor causing long waiting times is understaffing at certain points of time. Not 
all border booths are open around the clock causing delays during peak times.280 
Furthermore, certain government departments are only operating during the day, like 
the CFIA, FDA and USDA. For any food or drug shipments to get cleared the FDA 
agents have to be present.281  
 
Shipments between Canada and the United States are inspected on both sides of the 
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border.282 Both countries’ customs agents have the required technology to conduct 
detailed inspections through NII technology. There is no need for duplicative controls 
that cause double the work.283 
4.2.2.2 Increasing fees for crossing the border 
For any cross-border shipment the customs officers charge a border crossing fee 
called “service charge”. There is a range from a minimum to a maximum amount. This 
comes in addition to any additional costs incurred by the customer while the shipment 
is tied up at the border.284 
 
The soaring number of controls and inspections in recent years required more border 
agents per shipment and this increased the pressure for funding from the countries’ 
governments. In particular, specific shipments like food or animals require more time 
and effort per cross-border shipment. Currently, governments are looking to recover 
these costs through pay-per-use fees. An example is the U.S. Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) fee285 that is intended to cover the extra costs that 
inspections of fruits and vegetables entering the U.S. require. Not only commercial 
shippers have to pay this fee, but also all air passengers. Membership in any of the 
security programs does not exempt shippers or travelers from paying. The fact that 
U.S. border agents collect this money personally causes even more delays in the 
supply chain.286 The overall increase in costs is hampering trade as not many 
companies can afford to participate in cross-border trade anymore. In particular, small 
and medium-size businesses are affected. 
 
Penalty fees can become a major financial burden for companies that do not follow the 
requirements correctly. Mistakes do not only include missing documentation, but also a 
wrong description of the shipped commodity. Penalty fees can go up to a maximum of 
$25,000.287 For companies considering expanding into cross-border trade, the lack of 
required expertise can make the new venture unviable due to the risk of heavy 
penalties. 
 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce have 
proposed replacing user fees with an entirely government funded program for low-risk 
shipments.288 The author disagrees with this idea and would rather suggest funding out 
                                               
282 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk and U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009),  
p. 11 
283 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 11 
284 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
285 Cf. United States Department of Agriculture (2008) 
286 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 6 
287 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
288 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 12 
  55 
of user fees and penalties for non-compliance. The existing user fees should be 
reduced to a smaller amount. This would also relieve small and medium businesses 
from these huge expenses. The rest of the funding should be done through the penalty 
charges companies get charged when they do not have the necessary documentation 
or do not follow the required schedule. 
4.2.2.3 Changing operating practices 
The trend of Just in Time delivery is already reversing and companies are going back 
to the old fashioned inventory management practice of increasing warehousing. Only 
with increased inventory levels businesses can guarantee no stock outs, on-time 
deliveries and satisfied customers. After the signing of the free trade agreement North 
American companies were reducing their inventory and thus the related inventory 
costs. Expedited trade across the borders of Canada and the U.S. and between the 
U.S. and Mexico was meant to make Just in Time delivery and Just in Time production 
easy for North American companies thereby increasing their competitiveness on the 
global market. Now companies’ costs for transportation, warehousing and waiting time 
at borders exceed their production costs by far. This development does not only 
influence jobs and the growth of companies, but also their competitive advantage.289 
Europe, but in particular Asia’s emerging markets are outperforming the once strongest 
economy in the world. 
 
Companies also increased the flexibility of their operations to be able to better react to 
unforeseen disruptions or delivery delays. They use the same plant layout and the 
same processes across the company and their products are made out of generic parts 
that are interchangeable. The actual customizing steps are postponed to a later point in 
the whole production process providing more semi-finished goods to fill deficits. 
Furthermore, they train their employees in a variety of areas to ensure complete 
flexibility and customer satisfaction. Communication between employees is critical so 
that individuals or certain teams can make right decisions in case of unpredicted 
events.290 Corporate culture is a key factor. Byrnes identifies necessary cultural traits 
when summarizing Yossi Sheffi’s book The Resilient Enterprise in the Harvard 
Business School Working Knowledge Newsletter:291 
 Continuous communication among informed employees 
 Deference to expertise 
 Distributed power 
 Knowledgeable, experienced management involved in operations 
 Passionate and trustworthy employees and 
 Innovation and flexibility inside the organization.  
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The introduction of strict security regulations along the U.S.-Canadian border also 
changed the way domestic Canadian cargo is moved from east to west and back. Due 
to better road infrastructure it is easier, faster and safer to go through the United States 
if you want to travel from Eastern Canada to Western Canada or vice versa. Lately 
carriers use the more dangerous road north of the Great Lakes to cross Canada which 
costs about $1,000 CDN more per load just to avoid crossing the border.292  
 
The prior notification of sea shipments 24 hours before lading also impacted the lake 
transportation that was going on in the Great Lakes area between Canada and the 
United States. The so-called short sea shipping on Lake Erie, for example, transported 
truck trailers between the two countries over a distance of only 105 kilometres. With the 
24 hours advance cargo information rule this has become impossible and carriers have 
switched to shipping via truck or rail over distances that are about four times as long as 
the Lake Erie route.293  
4.2.2.4 Missing promised commercial benefits 
When becoming a trusted member of one of the security programs the U.S., Canadian 
and Mexican governments promise short-term as well as long-term benefits to 
companies. Those benefits are supposed to outweigh the costs that are related to an 
application. In reality, though, certified businesses hardly see any expedited handling of 
their cargo. Regularly they are still sent to secondary inspections and as a result 
subject to additional fees.294 And just one security incident will hinder their border 
crossing in the future even more. This again curtails the growth of trade and rather than 
motivating businesses, it is discouraging them. 
Furthermore, frustration is being mentioned due to waiting times even at the 
designated FAST lanes that are caused by inadequate infrastructure at the borders. In 
high volume times the lines of passenger vehicles or commercial vehicles other than 
FAST participants go back far beyond the entrance to the FAST lanes making it 
impossible for FAST members to enter the expediting lanes. So also certified members, 
who had enormous costs in order to get the certification, get stuck in traffic jams and 
face long delays.295 The key question is, then, if the work and effort to get a 
membership is worth it when not receiving the anticipated advantages. 
 
Another issue is the fact that less-than-truckload carriers are not eligible for expedited 
border crossing through FAST lanes unless every single shipment loaded is from a 
FAST certified importer. The requirement that the carrier, the driver himself and the 
importer must be certified reduces the number of shipments that can actually benefit 
from FAST to a small number. Carriers that have the company as well as all its drivers 
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all certified cannot make use of the expedited lanes when they have goods aboard 
whose consignees are not FAST certified. Also courier companies shipping small 
packages face the same problem.296 In this context it should be mentioned that 
shipments under the so-called section 321 do not require an inspection with CBP. 
Cargo with a value of under $200 falls under this special regulation, except if it is 
hazardous. Any hazardous material always needs to be checked by customs.297 
 
To conclude, the author wants to mention a good example in favour of C-TPAT, CSI 
and the 24-hour rule. Hasbro, a toy manufacturer initially spent about $200,000 in order 
to become a C-TPAT member and the annual maintaining costs are around $112,500. 
It started paying off right away. Already from 2001 to 2003 an enormous drop of 
inspections from 7.6% down to 0.66% was experienced. It saves the company now up 
to $550,000 per year.298 
4.3 Analysis of the security initiatives from the 
perspective of logistics providers and carriers 
In this section the programs’ impact on the individual businesses is examined. In order 
to be able to give a good overview logistics providers and freight forwarders were 
investigated as they play a major role all along the supply chain. 
The personal interviews have been conducted in the companies’ facilities in New York 
City in the United States and in Toronto and Edmonton in Canada. The interviews took 
place between March and August 2009. After a personal interview with a logistics 
provider in New York in March, a telephone interview was added in August to include 
updated information about this company. Telephone conversations were held with 
experts from all over the United States and email correspondence took place with 
companies in the U.S. as well as Mexico. Those interviews were conducted between 
December 2008 and August 2009. For two of the three logistics providers, two people 
from different departments within the organization were interviewed to give a better 
insight into this topic. For one carrier out of the two, also multiple people were asked. 
Furthermore, logisticians within the same company, but situated in different countries 
were included in this study. Besides the primary sources, also reliable internet sources, 
journals, articles as well as conducted studies about this specific area were used for 
this analysis. 
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4.3.1 Case study: Logistics providers 
Three logistics providers have been interviewed to get an insight into the security 
programs’ impact on these businesses. All three interviewed companies operate across 
the North American continent legitimizing the generality of the findings. Whereas the 
first two companies are big players in the global market, the third company is 
comparably small. Size related differences in the handling of the security programs will 
also be discussed. The three companies are Exel, DHL Global Forwarding and cargo-
partner. 
4.3.1.1 Brief description of the interviewed logistics providers 
Exel is a contract logistics provider in North America that operates all over the United 
States, Canada and Mexico. It generates more than $4.8 billion dollars in annual 
revenue and has 40,000 associates. In 2004, Exel was acquired by Deutsche Post 
DHL and it is part of its Supply Chain division.299 
Exel provides third-party logistics and customized supply chain solutions to its 
customers. Its services include consulting, supply chain design, warehousing, 
fulfillment and transportation.300 It also offers supply chain management, assembly and 
packaging, service parts logistics, return logistics and home and business deliveries. It 
deals with less-than-truckload shipments, truckload shipments and intermodal 
shipments.301 Exel’s support allows its customers, mostly manufacturers, to be more 
efficient, more productive and thus more competitive.302  
Exel’s operations are structured into small units all over North America that individually 
meet its customers’ needs. This can range from just forwarding cargo to the complete 
warehousing and distribution. Depending on what the individual business of each 
customer looks like, Exel may adjust its services.303 
The major part of the transportation is taking place between the U.S. and Canada. Exel 
also has operations in Mexico. They use all four modes of transportation road, 
maritime, air and rail. While truck and rail are handled under one division, air and sea 
containers are being dealt with in a separate department. They also have agents that 
do deliveries for them. As Exel does not organize shipments across the border itself, an 
interview with one of Exel’s carriers will follow in chapter 4.3.2 to complete the supply 
chain view.304 
 
DHL Global Forwarding is the international market leader for freight shipments via air 
and sea. Its services also include overland transportation services as well as 
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customized logistics solutions for major projects and excellent customer service.305 
This division is part of the Deutsche Post DHL that generated revenue of 63 billion euro 
in 2007.306 In 2008, the group counted 300,000 employees worldwide.307 The DHL 
Global Forwarding Air division offers both scheduled connections and charter 
possibilities based on partnership agreements with over 30 major carriers.308 Also DHL 
Global Forwarding Ocean division maintains a strong relationship with their carriers. 
They handle less-than-container (LCL) loads, full-container (FCL) loads and non-
containerized shipments.309 Also warehousing and distribution centers are amongst 
DHL Global Forwarding’s services.310 Unlike Exel, DHL Global Forwarding organizes 
cross-border shipments in North America and offers customs management.311 
 
Cargo-partner GmbH is an international full-service forwarding company that was 
founded in Vienna in Austria. As of today its operations are all around the world with 96 
offices in 23 countries. The logistics service provider covers 17 European countries, 
India, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore and the United States of America. 
In 2008, 61.4% of all of cargo-partner’s shipments were by ship, 30.9% were by truck 
and only 7.7% by air. The group’s turnover in the year 2008 was 406 million euro and 
they employ around 2,000 associates.312 
They were not only the first ones to conquer the Eastern European market, but also 
developed excellent knowledge overseas. With this experience, cargo-partner focuses 
on becoming the strongest and most innovative transportation logistics provider rather 
than being the largest.313  
The only Cargo-Partner office in North America is in New York City in the United States 
and they deal with shipments coming into the U.S. as well as with cargo being transited 
through the U.S. into Canada. The New York office opened in 2001314 and it makes up 
only 1% of the group’s workforce.315 Although the New York office mostly deals with sea 
import from Europe and India, they do handle shipments across the border to Canada 
or Mexico. Cargo-partner also has a warehouse for 2 big customers and handles their 
distribution all across the U.S. For cross-border shipments, cargo-partner mostly 
handles transit following their own internal transit process. The customs clearance is 
done by a customs broker. Mexico has even more special procedures, mentioned 
Pfeufer. Cargo-partner has an agent who deals with the Mexico processes where -for 
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example- labeling is stricter than in its neighboring countries. Only certain truck 
companies can do the actual crossing of the border and so there are companies who 
only perform cross-border shipments the whole day. When shipping into the U.S. from 
Mexico there are 3 seperate customs checks in the border area, explains Pfeufer.316 
4.3.1.2 Certifications and memberships 
Certain security initiatives do not apply to logistics providers who are just offering 
services to their customers. 
The logistics service provider Exel, for example, is not certified in any of the discussed 
programs. As far as C-TPAT is concerned, 3PLs are not required to be certified, 
explains Betscha from Exel headquarters. Exel, though, is C-TPAT qualified, which 
means it follows all required security regulations and this is enough for its customers 
and business partners. The essential thing is to have all the required security 
processes and procedures in place. The actual certification is much more important for 
manufacturers, exporters, trucking companies, ports and terminals and importers. All 
those agents play a crucial role in the supply chain of a product and if any one of those 
is trying to do something bad, this has an enormous effect on the businesses and 
people struck by the event.317  
DHL Global Forwarding, on the other hand, is C-TPAT certified. It received its 
certification in 2003 and a re-validation was granted in 2008.318  
Cargo-partner is currently in the process of applying for C-TPAT for its office in New 
York. The company is of the opinion that C-TPAT has basically become a must as 
customers, who are C-TPAT members themselves, require it from their business 
partners.319 Furthermore, a certification in this program can be used as a marketing 
tool. The logistics provider is aware that smaller businesses probably do not all know 
C-TPAT yet, but some big importers request this certification from their logistics 
providers and other business partners. Although C-TPAT is currently mainly addressing 
importers, the company believes that future adjustments to the program will also bring 
benefits for all other agents along.320 
 
Exel is also not certified in Canada’s PIP program. Similar to C-TPAT, there are many 
reasons why Exel is not certified. First, there is no real demand for logistics providers to 
become a program member. Second, it has financial reasons. It is very costly to get 
every single facility up to the standard it needs to be and the many branches across 
North America make it difficult to coordinate collaborative compliance. Thirdly, Betscha 
explains that having customers that are C-TPAT certified is pretty similar to being 
certified itself. The government comes regularly and checks Exel facilities as soon as 
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those facilities are handling cargo for C-TPAT members. Thus, Exel is quasi qualified, 
yet saves the money of the application process and ongoing costs of operation.321 
In comparison to that, DHL Global Forwarding is PIP certified and collaborates actively 
with the Canadian government and government agencies to meet the cargo security 
requirements while trying to ensure facilitation of trade.322 
Cargo-partner does not have a PIP membership as transportation into Canada is not 
the company’s core business.323 
 
As far as the FAST program is concerned, Exel has a subcontractor who deals with the 
initiatives and all related documents and preparations.324 The same case relates to 
cargo-partner.325 Whereas Exel and cargo-partner are not involved in the details of 
cross-border transportation, DHL Global Forwarding is FAST certified.326 
 
Table 7 shows which of the interviewed logistics providers are C-TPAT, PIP or FAST 
certified. 
 
Table 7 Certifications of interviewed logistics providers 
 Exel DHL Global 
Forwarding 
cargo-partner 
C-TPAT certified no yes in application process 
PIP certified no yes no 
FAST certified no yes no 
(Source: Own creation after interview with Paul Betscha, interview with Craig Hisle, interview with Luis 
Coppel and interview with Ralf Pfeufer) 
 
It is interesting to see that only one interviewed company is clearly pursuing 
certifications in security programs and initiatives. The reason could be the differing core 
business of the different service providers. While Exel is only offering the service of 
planning and organizing its customers’ logistics, DHL Global Forwarding is more 
involved in the actual transportation of cargo. They offer scheduled shipments with their 
own trucks and this increases the need for compliance. Another reason is the 
companies’ organizational structure. Exel is split up into small business units each 
serving one single customer under an exclusive contract. DHL Global Forwarding, 
however, also ships LTL shipments for a variety of different customers. This requires 
more flexibility and an overall higher security level. Also the types of customers could 
have influenced that development. DHL Global Forwarding’s large number of 
customers ship goods all around the globe. Exel’s customers are mainly manufacturers 
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situated in a specific area. To decrease production costs, they tend to use suppliers 
that are geographically close to the production site. Only when they need special 
equipment they ship parts from overseas and then Exel mainly uses global carriers like 
FedEx or DHL.327 Cargo-partner is currently in the process of applying for a C-TPAT 
membership. Being the subsidiary of a European company made it difficult for the New 
York office to receive a certification earlier. As cargo-partner does not have its own 
trucks, a FAST membership is not necessary. 
Generally it can be said that only a small number of security initiatives touch a logistics 
provider’s area. The programs mentioned in this thesis are of much greater relevance 
for carriers. Chapter 4.3.2 will provide a case study about carriers.   
 
The interviewed logistics providers are usually not dealing with any matters that relate 
to the 24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule.328 Only goods coming DDP (delivered 
duty paid) involve logistics providers like cargo-partner as they require specific 
documents.329 Generally the information process involved in the shipping process is 
more the customs broker’s area of duty. Cargo-partner is not a certified customs 
broker, but has a daughter company dealing with this process. This customs broker is 
C-TPAT certified. Usually cargo-partner provides its customs broker with the respective 
documents. There is a strict time line to be followed and any information missing can 
lead to delays. The cargo cut-off, where the container has to be in the terminal loaded, 
is three days before sailing. The cut-off for the 24-hour rule documents is one day 
before the cargo cut-off. When the documents are not perfectly prepared, the container 
gets loaded only one week later.330 Also Exel has an external customs broker, whereas 
DHL Global Forwarding has a customs clearance department incorporated into the 
company structure.331 
4.3.1.3 Benefits  
Benefits for logistics providers can be tangible as well as intangible.  
Tangible benefits include faster processing of shipments and lower probability of 
inspections once compliance with the most important security initiatives is achieved. 
This also makes a freight forwarder’s job easier and decreases costs. 
Yet, many companies in the industry would argue that this is not the case. Certified 
companies have yet to experience the promised significant decrease in inspections. 
According to Keenan from cargo-partner New York the only advantage for certified 
companies is found in the event of a terror attack. Containers of C-TPAT certified 
companies, for example, would then still be processed while all other containers would 
undergo strict inspections and experience enormous delays. Another frustration is 
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based on the fact that there is no information available as to why a container was 
chosen for further inspections and held at the border. Thus, companies do not get the 
chance to work on the step that went wrong and improve for the next shipment.332 
There is still a problem in the area of liability and accountability. In particular the 
logistics provider’s situation is problematic as it is impossible to guarantee certain 
security standards for all agents that are involved in the shipping process.333 
So tangible benefits are very controversial. 
 
There are some intangible benefits for logistics service providers. They benefit from 
satisfied customers. Due to the increased security enforcement through new initiatives, 
the positive outcomes of compliance can be seen by manufacturers and they in turn 
bring business to logistics providers. In the long run the costs for increased security 
practices are offset by the savings that are created through the proactive security 
approach. Costs due to higher safety stock, longer cash-to-cash cycles, lost revenue 
through more probable stock-outs and increased transportation costs due to increased 
need for express shipments are disappearing.334 Stanford University published a report 
confirming several benefits the security initiatives brought to companies. On average 
companies had a 48% reduction in customs inspections, a 29% reduction in transit 
time, a 14% reduction in excess inventory as well as an improvement of on-time 
shipping to customers by 30% and an improvement of asset visibility by 50%.335 The 
interviewed logistics providers see the increasing investment costs just as a change of 
scope of their services for manufacturers and shippers. They need to follow the trend in 
order to keep their customers. 
 
Another intangible benefit is the installation of risk management systems in 
organizations. Before the event of 9/11 many companies did not have any risk 
management system in place at all. The terror attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon opened the trade community’s eyes and promoted the creation of 
security plans and risk management mechanisms. Companies now harvest a long-term 
profit from those implementations. 
 
Furthermore, security initiatives create marketing opportunities for logistics providers. 
Certain manufacturers and shippers will only deal with certified and compliant partners. 
Cargo-partner, for instance, is sure that after a successful application in the C-TPAT 
program, the marketing department will implement this in its marketing plan.336  
Exel’s success and competitiveness as a logistics provider was only partly influenced 
by its compliance with the continuously increasing security standards. According to 
Exel, it depends heavily on the individual customer and their products & specific 
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regulations. Generally, it is believed that the hype about programs like C-TPAT has 
diminished in the past few years. C-TPAT was always just intended to be a “benefit” in 
international trade with the purpose of expediting global trade. While its importance is 
slowly decreasing, other trends have increased. In particular, road and air security has 
increased and a continuous trend can be expected in the future.337 For DHL Global 
Forwarding the market pressure was the biggest driver that made the company pursue 
compliance and outweighed any potential marketing benefit.338 
An interesting fact is that Keenan from cargo-partner believes that C-TPAT can better 
be seen as a marketing campaign of the U.S. CBP to increase the security awareness 
of the whole industry and make companies improve their internal security standards.339  
4.3.1.4 Increased costs 
Costs for participation in any of the security programs are high and they include up-
front investment costs as well as on-going costs. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
published numbers together with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce on that. 
According to their study the process of becoming certified can last up to two years and 
cost a business more than $100,000 in initial costs.340  
 
For logistics providers the following initial costs can be identified: 
 Infrastructure improvement costs 
 Restructuring costs and 
 Research costs. 
 
The new security regulations all require infrastructure improvements. For logistics 
providers, the physical security in the offices needs to be improved. So far cargo-
partner New York conducted complete background checks on all its employees and 
introduced ID cards for employees as well as visitors. Also extra walls and a new 
reception to register visitors got built. In the future the office might also mount cameras 
to further improve the overall security in and around the office.341 DHL Global 
Forwarding is facing similar expenses.342 The logistics provider Exel has also 
experienced increased costs. Generally, there was an increase in the facilities’ physical 
standards by 50%.343 
Restructuring costs arise when certain business practices are changed. An example is 
cargo-partner, who outsourced the filing of manifests. The system that provides the link 
to CBP for any advance cargo manifest information is provided by an external service 
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provider. They receive the required information from cargo-partner who receives it from 
the customer. The IT service provider gets paid for each filing that it completes for 
cargo-partner. At the end of the day this is a cheaper way for a small logistics provider 
like cargo-partner who does not process a large volume of filings.344  
Research costs include any costs that are connected to staying up-to-date and follow 
new developments on a daily basis.  
 
Recurring costs can be split up into: 
 Additional staffing 
 Security filing transaction costs and 
 Maintenance costs of physical security and staff. 
 
All three interviewed logistics providers had to increase the number of employees 
working in the area of security and compliance in the past years.345 
When brokers file entries for importers, the importer usually gets charged per filing. In a 
cost benefit study by DHS and CBP released late 2008 it says that small and medium 
sized businesses tend more to switch to self-filing to reduce costs.346 Cargo-partner, 
however, stated the opposite argument. As mentioned above, they outsourced the filing 
process to an IT service provider to reduce extra staff, training and systems costs.347 
An example of maintenance costs is Exel. For Exel costs for maintenance, repair and 
training are the major part of the on-going costs.348 The company has a specific staff 
members assigned to the job of compliance with all safety and security regulations and 
represents these issues at the higher corporate level. This person’s position is not 
necessarily linked directly to the intensified customs’ security requirements, but the 
need for such a position evolved after the events of 9/11. The staff member deals with 
drivers’ qualifications and other procedures that need to be followed in order to be 
compliant with the law. In Canada a driver’s qualification involves a detailed 
background check on the driver’s safety as well as past employers. In the U.S., a 
criminal background check is required as well. Furthermore, a drug screening is being 
done at a growing frequency. Similar checks are being conducted with warehouse 
associates. Particularly harsh are the checks on drivers of hazardous material. 
Sometimes even fingerprints are taken. Those strict enforcements are mostly general 
state regulations and not necessarily from the customs agencies. The security 
regulations, overall, became more strict about compliance and enforcement after 9/11, 
Hisle says.349 Also Exel as well as DHL Global Forwarding have expenses in order to 
maintain their facilities’ security standards.350 
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Logistics providers may also be the supply chain member to provide the money for 
penalty charges. They have to pay first and only afterwards they charge their clients for 
it. Also other occurring costs are first paid by logistics providers and they then pass the 
charges on to their customers. An example of those costs would be costs due to 
waiting time at the border.351  
Cargo-partner, for example, either pays the charges to the shipping company who 
received the invoice from the customs authority. Or the customs authority charged the 
customs broker and he passes the charges on to cargo-partner. When companies bring 
their cargo earlier to make space in the warehouse, they get charged so-called “per 
diem” charges per day by the port.352 
4.3.1.5 Increased work 
CBP published a survey about C-TPAT’s costs and benefits and mentioned an overall 
increase of work by 32.8% for logistics providers.353  
 
Although Exel is not directly affected by the different initiatives and their policies, Exel 
indirectly experienced significant influence on its business. As already mentioned Exel 
adjusts to its customer’s needs and so does each Exel business unit’s choice of 
security measures to implement. According to Exel, the overall security in certain 
specific industries, like the pharmaceutical industry or military increased immensely 
since 2001. Not only have the standards increased as parts of regulations, also the 
demand for specialized security people rose in the past. Customers from critical 
industries require special people at Exel’s sites who have a deep knowledge about the 
special requirements in order to be security compliant. In Canada they have to go 
through government training classes focusing on specific security and safety aspects. 
As far as Exel’s military customers are concerned, the U.S. military itself comes onto 
site and ensures that all regulations are properly followed.354 In general, Exel saw an 
enormous increase in security related regulations. They are 5 or 6 times more than 
before the terror attacks of New York and Washington D.C. in 2001, Betscha 
mentions.355 The respective security specialists are embedded within the company 
structure according to the industry. The security department of pharmaceutical 
products, for instance, is under the umbrella of life science. With this structure in place 
it is easier to keep up-to-date on what new security requirements are. Every facility has 
an operations manager who is responsible for security of his employees and 
associates as well as goods within this facility. Of course also HR and the site 
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supervisors play an important role as well. In conclusion, the security message is 
carried from the management top down to the people in the field.356 
DHL Global Forwarding has security professionals scattered around North America 
who developed an exceptional expertise in the security field.357 
As far as cargo-partner is concerned, the intensifications of security regulations in the 
past years did not force the office in New York to increase their workforce with 
specialists. Yet, the existing employees for sure work more.358 There is visibly more 
work in the Operations as well as Compliance department where the aforementioned 
programs are dealt with.359 In particular, the long C-TPAT application process requires 
extra training to develop expertise in this specific area. And to keep the C-TPAT 
certification cargo-partner needs to maintain a secure supply chain requiring all their 
business partners to be compliant as well. Being the branch of a European company 
made the preparation more difficult in many ways for them. Extra time was dedicated to 
collecting all the necessary information and to discover the critical factors to measure. 
A consulting firm is supporting and helping cargo-partner in all the phases of the 
application. The overall process is believed to take about 1 year. In order to complete 
the application, a 30 page application form has to be completed in conjunction with a 
questionnaire to all the warehouses and business partners that must be sent out. This 
questionnaire can be found in appendix 5. The purpose of the questionnaire is to 
evaluate the security standards of those partner facilities as they have a direct or 
indirect influence on cargo-partner’s security. This process, though, appears to be very 
difficult and it is hard to get completed questionnaires returned. While cargo-partner’s 
own facilities quickly returned the completed questionnaires, it is particularly difficult to 
get replies from any overseas business partners. The reason for not returning the 
questionnaire is the time and work it takes to complete the 11 page document. It 
involves different areas of the company and so it is difficult to find time to complete 
those questions during normal working hours. Cargo-partner could apply before all the 
sent questionnaires are returned to them, but to have numerous documents proving the 
security of its business partners will better reflect cargo-partner and increase its chance 
for certification. Pfeufer says that a never returned questionnaire will not influence the 
business relation with this specific partner.360  
 
Companies have to stay up-to-date and this requires people who make sure they 
capture every new development. 
In Exel’s operations, the information comes from many different sources: third party 
logistics services, e-mail alerts, mail alerts, government agencies’ websites and 
industrial periodicals. Furthermore, Exel is part of certain organizations and it uses 
certain vendors to make sure they are up to the required standards. Last but not least 
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Exel’s customers inform them about new developments in their specific industry.361  
Also DHL Global Forwarding makes sure to follow every new regulation change and be 
compliant with all improved regulations by using similar sources of information.362 
Cargo-partner tries to be up-to-date at all times to maintain its competitiveness within 
the market. The respective employees dealing with security attend monthly meetings 
with the Long Island Import Export Association as well as on the airport. Moreover, they 
receive e-mail updates on new developments from CBP, the National Customs 
Association, different marine terminals and the cargo-partner headquarters.363 
4.3.1.6 Trade facilitation or hindrance for logistics providers 
For Exel the whole trend of increasing security standards seems to be a good idea. 
Specific commodities, however, need to be addressed more than others. For certain 
more risky goods it is good to have the possibility of tracking them down and securing 
that they cannot harm anybody. A big obstacle is that regulations never change as 
quickly as issues arise, says Betscha. Process wise, the regulations represent an 
enormous hindrance for the company. The start and setting up of the necessary 
processes is time consuming and means extra costs to the companies.364 Exel would 
definitely welcome the possibility of certification for single facilities and sites, rather 
certifying the company as a whole entity. As of today, 10-15% of Exel’s facilities would 
fulfill the respective requirements to become a C-TPAT member.365  
Coppel from DHL Global Forwarding is of the opinion that it can generally be seen as a 
trade facilitation. Even if a lot of time-consuming learning is involved, it makes 
processes faster in the long-term. In particular the FAST program enormously 
expedites transportation for this company.366 
According to Keenan from cargo-partner even non C-TPAT-certified companies can get 
their cargo quickly into the U.S. by just strictly following CSI, 24-hour rule and 10+2 
rule.367 
4.3.2 Case study: Carriers 
Now the programs’ impact on freight carriers will be analyzed. Two carriers were 
interviewed, YRC Reimer and Transportes Olympic. Due to the significantly high 
volume of truck traffic within the North American continent both companies ship mostly 
by truck. Whereas the first company is a large company with many more available 
resources, the second company is a small business. Differences in their way of dealing 
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with the intensified regulations and the response to them will also be analyzed. 
4.3.2.1 Brief description of the interviewed carriers 
YRC Reimer is the Canadian subsidiary of the holding company YRC Worldwide Inc., 
one of the largest transportation providers in the world. YRC was founded through the 
merger of Yellow Transportation in Ohio and Roadway in Oklahoma. Its headquarters 
are in Kansas in the United States and their workforce includes 59,000 people. YRC 
offers transportation across the United States, Canada and Mexico by ground or air. In 
Mexico YRC Transportation S.A. de C.V. runs their operation.368 
Roadway acquired the Canadian coast-to-coast logistics service provider Reimer 
Express in 1997. In 2003 they joined together with Yellow to become the Yellow 
Roadway Corporation. YRC Reimer is now YRC Worldwide Inc.’s largest subsidiary.369 
 
Transportes Olympic is a Mexican trucking company involved in cross-border 
transportation as well as cross-country transportation across North America.370  This 
company was the first Mexican carrier to be allowed operation within the United States 
in 2007. This was a milestone for the company considering that the border crossing 
into the U.S. was forbidden for Mexican trucks between 1982 and 2007.371  
It was founded in June 1990 by Fernando Paez and is now the market leader in the 
import and export transportation of goods without unloading and reloading at the 
Mexican border. Transportes Olympic ships the freight straight to the destination in the 
United States, Canada or Mexico, giving it a distinct competitive advantage over its 
Mexican counterparts.372 
Compared to the YRC group it is just a small business. The company’s greatest focus 
lies on complying with security and safety policies.373 
4.3.2.2 Certifications and memberships 
YRC Reimer is certified in the C-TPAT, PIP, FAST, CSA as well as the U.S. ACE and 
Canadian ACI program and it has representatives at all main border-crossing points in 
North America.374 
The C-TPAT application was done by YRC Reimer’s headquarters in the United States 
with strong collaboration with CBP and CBSA. All facilities in the U.S., Canada and 
Mexico then had to implement the required security standards accordingly. They had 
gates built to protect the facilities from foreign intruders, installed security cameras and 
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only the designated staff is allowed on the docks to prevent any strangers from hiding 
goods in the trailers that could present a risk. In the offices visitor batches were 
introduced and everybody coming onto the facility has to sign in with his/her name and 
sign out upon leaving again. Although there are no night guards, YRC Reimer has hired 
guards on the weekends. They patrol around the facility as well as use the cameras to 
capture any tamper attempts. As far as the employees’ backgrounds go, there are 
detailed checks on every driver. The U.S. Customs authority conducts on-site checks 
only in U.S. facilities.375  
Transportes Olympic is C-TPAT certified and obtained its C-TPAT membership status in 
September 2007.376 Being a Mexican company it was absolutely necessary to become 
certified in order to gain respect from U.S. businesses and individuals and win their 
confidence. When Transportes Olympic first crossed the border into the United States, 
many voices got loud saying that the carrier had insufficient security standards.377 The 
C-TPAT certification proved their compliance winning more and more U.S. clients. 
 
YRC’s Canadian division is a member of PIP since February 2009378 and CBSA 
regularly comes to the Canadian sites to check the implemented security procedures. 
Those agencies also conduct records audits making sure all the processes are 
compliant with their regulations. The Canadian PIP takes its members a step further 
and wants to promote proactive behavior. When drivers see suspicious cars at the 
border while waiting, for example, they are required to report this incident.379 
Transportes Olympic does not see a need for a PIP certification yet, as the majority of 
its business is between the U.S. and Mexico and the costs related to a certification 
would outweigh any benefits.380 
 
YRC Reimer is FAST certified since March 2003381 and for the Canadian company 
division the whole handling is run out of the Canadian headquarters in Winnipeg, 
Manitoba. After detailed background checks, drivers need to get a FAST card. It 
involves a detailed application process that is done for them in Winnipeg. The card’s 
validity is lost when the driver leaves the company. 
When truck drivers leave the dock in direction of a border crossing, they need to have a 
truck manifest, the so-called ACE electronic manifest, with them. An example of such 
an Automated Commercial Environment manifest is shown in appendix 3. The 
Canadian company Reimer, having become a part of Roadway, got to be on the ACE 
test project that started in 2007. The ACE paperwork has to include a bill of lading and 
the customs documents. With those documents the following information must be 
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provided:382 
 Manufacturer’s address  
 Product’s country of origin  
 Product’s value and the used currency 
 Shipper’s name 
 Tax ID for customer in the U.S. 
 Destination in the U.S.  
 Name of customs broker and 
 PAPS number. 
The same applies to the Mexican carrier who is FAST certified as well. Its certification 
in the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program made the FAST 
application process simple and fast.383 
 
The following table gives an overview of the programs the interviewed carriers are 
certified in. 
 
Table 8 Certifications of interviewed carriers 
 YRC Reimer Transportes Olympic 
C-TPAT certified yes yes 
PIP certified yes no 
FAST certified yes yes 
(Source: Own creation after interview with Debbie Bychyk, interview with Patricia Scott and interview with 
Adriana Arredondo) 
 
When looking at this table one can immediately see that participation in security 
programs and initiatives is vital for a successful carrier. While YRC Reimer is certified 
in the C-TPAT program, PIP program and FAST program, Transportes Olympic is only 
C-TPAT and FAST certified. The Mexican carrier does not see a need for the Canadian 
PIP certification as the majority of its business is between the United States and 
Mexico.  
Both interviewed carriers ship cargo across the borders between the three NAFTA 
countries and thus long wait times and intense inspections at border crossings affect 
them the most. To be able to deliver the goods on time and satisfy their customers they 
have to pursue membership in security programs. YRC Reimer and Transportes 
Olympic confirmed that trend and clarified that they would have lost customers if they 
had not gone through the certification process.384 
4.3.2.3 Benefits 
Also carriers have tangible and intangible benefits. 
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Tangible benefits are without any doubt the reduced overall waiting time for their truck 
drivers at ports of entry.385   
As far as the maritime security improvements go, there are contradictory responses. 
On the one side, stowaways dropped more than 50% in the first 6 months of the ISPS 
Code.386 Yet, according to several cargo insurance underwriters, cargo theft has not 
visibly decreased in the months following the introduction of the ISPS Code leaving the 
question how secure ports and facilities really are against terrorist threats.387 
A point of criticism is the fact that ships are not protected from seaborne attacks. 
Furthermore, small commercial vessels, recreational vessels and vessels returning 
home after visiting a foreign port are not being covered at all.388 
The maritime transportation systems will always be more vulnerable than other modes 
of transportation due to their open nature.389 Dr. Stephen Flynn of the U.S. Council on 
Foreign Relations presented a possible scenario as how those initiatives can be 
thwarted by a terrorist on March 28, 2006 before the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee: A container full of sneakers made by a name-brand 
company in Indonesia gets breached and filled with a bomb on its way to the port 
without disturbing the mechanical seal. From the port there it gets shipped to Hong 
Kong and then to Vancouver. As the sneakers are from a name-brand company that is 
C-TPAT member, no port official in neither port undertakes further inspection. After 
arriving in Vancouver, it gets shipped to an American city and upon opening the bomb 
detonates.390 This example shows very well that one loose link in the chain destroys 
everybody else’s effort. Furthermore, it makes clear how difficult it is to say where the 
supply chain ends. One could say now that the 100% screening the U.S. requires is a 
necessary next step to even avoid such incidents. Yet, this would only be of advantage 
for the U.S. Moreover, the enormous influence on time on every single cargo shipment 
needs to be considered.  
 
CBP claims that CSI helps to move “containers faster, more efficiently and more 
predictably through the supply chain”.391 Their explanation is based on a faster and 
more efficient movement of the low-risk containers. Shipments often sit on the pier for a 
couple of days before being loaded on the vessel. They use this time to do the 
targeting and screening, thus allowing an immediate release once they arrived in the 
U.S.392 Containers that have already been examined in the foreign port, get a security 
seal and then the U.S. officers expedite them as soon as they arrive in a U.S. port. 
CBP says though, “that it reserves the right to inspect any cargo that arrives in the 
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United States, whether it has been pre-screened or not.”393 Although this will only be 
done when further information becomes available during the shipping process or the 
seal has been tampered, says CBP.394 Yet, one has to look at the whole picture and 
include the influences on companies. CBP, for example, holds all shipments that are 
together on a bill of lading when only one of the many containers is identified as risky. 
So all containers have to wait for this one container to be inspected and accepted by 
CBP. This causes long delays and high costs for the affected companies.395 
 
Intangible benefits for carriers are realized through marketing opportunities and 
improved brand image.  
Although a marketing advantage must be seen controversial as companies say that it is 
not a comparative advantage anymore to be compliant, but a must.396 CBP says that C-
TPAT is only for willing members. This, however, is not really true anymore. For a 
carrier, the security initiatives are not marketing nice-to-haves. Freight carriers must be 
compliant and certified in a number of programs and initiatives in order to be able to 
conduct international transportation. A lot of customers would not deal with a carrier 
who is not PIP or C-TPAT certified. If carriers did not go through the long and tiring 
application process, they would not have business at all.397  
 
If only certain companies requested their customers to follow intensive security 
measures and thus incur higher costs, and a competitor was not, the latter would have 
obvious business advantages. Given that, compliance with security requirements would 
be randomly met and the overall risk within the global supply chain would not be 
decreased.398 
4.3.2.4 Increased costs 
Also carriers face different kind of costs due to the required security standards and 
regulations. Two kinds of costs increased in the past years: initial implementation costs 
and recurring costs. 
 
One-time investment costs for carriers are: 
 Information system costs 
 Infrastructure improvement costs and 
 Research costs. 
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Information systems must be in place in order to be able to submit proper and complete 
security filings to customs computer systems technology. Existing systems can either 
be improved or new ones purchased. An upgraded IT system is not enough. 
Companies must also use a system that the customs agencies have approved and is 
capable of allowing all participants to communicate with each other.399 
Also infrastructure costs for physical security on site in the different facilities are faced. 
Maritime security initiatives, for instance, have required ports, terminals and ocean 
carriers to increase security standards in the past years. CBP claims, however, that 
there are basically no increased costs for CSI for host countries. They say that NII 
equipment like the X-ray and screening was already existent in most ports thanks to 
compliance with the ISPS code. Just software had to be bought, but this is essential for 
every port anyways, they say.400 And one has to include the benefits that are generated 
for the international trade community. There are so many players involved along a 
global supply chain and transport chain increasing the risk of tampering. It is true that 
tracking every single container that is being shipped around the world is very 
expensive. In particular, more complex systems, like the RFID technology, cause huge 
expenses. Yet, the market basically requires a continuous tracking from the 
manufacturer to the end consumer. Complexity is added due to the fact that cargo is 
being transported by different modes of transportation and across international borders 
with different laws enforced.401 
 
Another example for initial implementation costs are research costs. Just like logistics 
providers, carriers have to stay informed about new developments as far as regulations 
go. They rely on getting the information from all different kinds of sources. Yet, in most 
cases certain employees within the organization also get assigned to that task. For 
YRC Reimer its head office makes sure the respective people are up-to-date.402 Also 
the different subsidiaries within YRC inform each other about new developments.403 
 
Recurring costs are  
 Additional staff 
 Border crossing service fees/inspection fees and 
 Maintenance costs. 
 
There is additional staffing all across YRC’s facilities in North America.404 Each terminal 
has certain clerical workers that are only working on those initiatives. This involves 
gathering the necessary information, entering it into the database that is linked to CBP, 
writing all reports and preparing the envelopes with three copies of each required 
                                               
399 Cf. interview with Ralf Pfeufer and interview with Debbie Bychyk 
400 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007a), p. 4 
401 Cf. Sewak (2008), p. 220 
402 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
403 Cf. interview with Patricia Scott 
404 Cf. interview with Patricia Scott and interview with Debbie Bychyk 
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document for the drivers. After the drivers leave another employee checks if everything 
went through and the access into the country is granted. If there are any problems, 
there is enough time left before the driver actually arrives at the border allowing the 
employee to work on it. In case the time frame is too short and the problem cannot be 
solved prior to the driver’s arrival at the border a special unit helps out. The so-called 
ACE office gets involved and tries to get the freight cleared. An option is to bond it. 
Bonding means that it goes through the United States in transit and it will be cleared at 
the destination terminal. Yet, bonded shipments are more expensive as there are 
additional fees for issuing the bond, clearing the bond and covering the broker’s extra 
work.405 
For any shipments crossing the border a service fee needs to be paid according to the 
weight of the shipment. For customers that regularly cross the border a negotiated rate 
is the normal business practice. Bychyk not only mentions the border crossing fees as 
an extra expense, but also wait charges and penalty charges. In case of waiting time at 
the border due to a secondary inspection, for instance, extra waiting fees will be 
charged. In case of a mistake on the shipper’s or the carrier’s side, penalty charges will 
be billed. Examples are missing documents or the wrong description of the commodity. 
In case the company does not agree with the charged amount, there is the possibility of 
arbitration. YRC Reimer’s specific department in Winnipeg deals with penalty issues 
and can argue CBP’s charges. In case YRC Reimer gets billed, but it was the shipper’s 
fault, the carrier would pay the amount and then pass the charges on to its customer. It 
is also possible, however, that the U.S. CBP directly addresses the driver with the 
penalty, Bychyk says.406 For any secondary inspection it is also the carrier who gets 
charged and the shipper pays the carrier. Since 2001 companies had an increased 
number of containers being drawn.407 
Maintenance costs for carriers include training for staff as well as the maintenance of 
the facilities’ physical security. Transportes Olympic faces increased costs due to 
continuous upgrades in its technology.408 
 
The argument that CBP uses to justify costs is that many companies already had some 
of the required security practices incorporated into their business procedures far before 
2001.409 
4.3.2.5 Increased work 
CBP’s survey from August 2007 about C-TPAT’s costs and benefits lists carriers as 
having the highest increase of work. This program causes 39.4% more work for 
                                               
405 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
406 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
407 Cf. interview with Connie Powers and interview with Ralf Pfeufer 
408 Cf. interview with Adriana Arredondo 
409 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007i) 
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carriers.410 
 
YRC Reimer experienced significant changes in its operations since the intensification 
of security regulations in the past few years. Its business, however, was not negatively 
affected and it did not result in more work for the company. They just see it as part of 
their business. They had to learn the new programs, incorporate them into the daily 
routine and connect diverse systems. Furthermore, IT connection to the U.S. customs 
had to be set up. It took YRC Reimer in total 2 years to get all set up on the 
initiatives.411 
Debbie Bychyk from YRC Reimer provides an insight into the work that is involved in 
shipping across a national border. The shippers know what kind of information is 
needed in order for the carrier to bring the goods across the border. They provide YRC 
Reimer with all the documents and YRC Reimer deals with the rest of the process. The 
carrier uses an IT system that is connected directly to the U.S. Customs allowing them 
to communicate with each other at real time. Only certain people have access to 
certain areas and fields of this system trying to maximize its safety and integrity. Once 
all the documents are received, a YRC Reimer employee scans all the related 
documents and enters the customer’s information into the system. Then they send a 
message to U.S. Customs. If the shipment is identified as non-risky and is accepted to 
enter the United States, CBP will change the status in the system to “A”, meaning 
“Accepted”. Once the cargo is accepted, YRC Reimer prepares the ACE manifest for 
the driver that he will be required to present at the border. In case the trailer carries 
consolidated goods this manifest has to include the necessary information and codes, 
like the PAPS code, from every single shipment. When the truck is loaded the driver 
takes the documents consisting of three copies each and upon arrival at the border he 
will give them to the border agent. YRC Reimer informs the customs broker, provides 
him with the customer’s documents and then the broker arranges for customs 
clearance and entry online with CBP.412  
 
Figure 12 shows the above described border crossing process in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
410 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007l), p. 46 
411 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
412 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
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Figure 12 YRC Reimer’s Border Crossing Process 
 
(Source: interview with Debbie Bychyk) 
 
In this process YRC Reimer takes the role of the middle man providing the shipper with 
the service of arranging everything. Thus, the shipper does not have to deal with 
anything related to clearing shipments. The customs broker is involved in the actual 
customs clearance process. There are hundreds of brokers that YRC Reimer can 
approach, but when entering the U.S. it must always be a U.S. broker. A broker at an 
actual port of entry is preferred as this office is open 24/7. Another key entity in this 
whole process is the ACE office in Buffalo. It has representatives at the most popular 
crossings and helps the drivers with any ACE related issues. Generally it can be said 
that the entry into the U.S. is very tight whereas the entry into Canada is not as strict.413  
 
Also Transportes Olympic has experienced increased work. The border crossing and 
customs clearance process into Mexico is more complex. As the Mexican Customs 
agency tried to intensify their security regulations alongside their larger neighbour, the 
United States, freight forwarders had to be present at all ports of entry and basically 
walk the goods across the border. Learning the new processes increased the carrier’s 
amount of work enormously.414  
As far as YRC Reimer is concerned, it is registered in Mexico which allows the 
company to drive its trucks there.415 
 
Transportes Olympic’s owner Paez saw compliance with the U.S. security standards 
always as priority number one. Having a second company that operates in the U.S. 
enabled him to easily follow new developments and intensifications of U.S. security 
regulations.416 
                                               
413 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
414 Cf. interview with Adriana Arredondo and interview with Debbie Bychyk 
415 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
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YRC Reimer also puts a lot of effort into staying up-to-date with all security 
requirements. They continuously receive information from CBP, CBSA and other 
government agencies, its supply chain partners, logistics associations as well as 
logistics journals. Certain employees then distribute the gathered information across 
the organization.417 
4.3.2.6 Trade facilitation or hindrance 
CBP underlines the trade facilitation that results from C-TPAT.418 Also CSI is strongly 
emphasised. The security programs are not seen as a trade hindrance at all. According 
to CBP a terror attack would now not bring U.S. trade to a complete standstill.419 
 
According to YRC Reimer FAST made cross-border trucking faster than before the 
events of 9/11. It is true that the process implementation is very time and resource 
consuming, but once it is in place it is without any doubt a trade facilitation. 
Furthermore, it is good to know that the flow of goods is guaranteed, even in case of a 
disaster. In the weeks and months after the terror attacks, Bychyk says, everything 
came to a complete stop.420 
Also Transportes Olympic is in favour of the implemented security programs. In 
particular the border crossing at port of entries between Mexico and the U.S. has been 
expedited thanks to the different initiatives.421 
 
The 100% screening of maritime cargo containers, however, that is sought by the 
United States by 2012 would be an enormous trade hindrance. Right now only about 
2% to 3% of all containers destined for the U.S. are being screened. Screening every 
single one would lead to enormous delays.422  
4.4 Recommendations and best practices 
Possible improvements for the supply chain as a whole include more communication 
and information sharing. The countries’ governments and border agencies should work 
together strongly with businesses to assure smooth border crossing and benefits 
resulting from being part of a security program. The goal would be that border agents 
can focus their limited human and financial resources on risky or unknown shipments. 
This would increase overall security across North America, make the flow of trade 
                                               
417 Cf. interview with Patricia Scott 
418 Cf. U.S. CBP (2004b) 
419 Cf. U.S. CBP (2007a), p. 4 
420 Cf. interview with Debbie Bychyk 
421 Cf. interview with Adriana Arredondo 
422 Cf. Springer Transport Media GmbH (2008) 
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faster and attract more companies to become certified in security initiatives.423 
Businesses also know better what their real needs are and what would help them move 
goods faster, so they are the governments’ best source of input. Cooperation should 
also happen between the countries border agencies and the WCO. 
 
Another recommendation is the setting of specific goals about what the highest priority 
steps are that need to be taken to achieve higher security levels all over the North 
American continent and what are their deadlines. This then has to be continuously 
controlled using metrics. The governments should use internal as well as external 
metrics. External metrics should be published and visible to the trade community. The 
internal metrics should only be open to the different government agencies outlining 
their duties. 
 
As far as C-TPAT and PIP are concerned, the U.S. and Canadian customs authorities 
should consider allowing certification for one office or facility rather than only for the 
organization as a whole. 
 
Harmonization of IT standards would make the trade system more efficient. A single 
filing system should be implemented that all government agencies have access to. 
Businesses would only have to deal with one format for documents and forms and 
could use one single system for any contact with any of the agencies. Moreover, it 
would be easier to sustain consistent definitions of data elements for overall clearer 
and more effective communication.424 
 
Small and medium-size businesses that cannot afford the high costs of application and 
participation in existing programs should be granted special lower tariffs and fees. An 
idea would be a payment calculation according to cargo shipped per year. 
 
A better system for less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments needs to be put into place. The 
author recommends clear communication of the problem of non-compliance if one of 
the shipments in the LTL container is not certified. When consolidating the trailers, 
special attention should be made to which shipment is certified and which one is not. 
According to the status of compliance the shipments should be consolidated into 
different trucks. Trucks carrying only compliant cargo can then take advantage of the 
expedited lanes while the non-compliant shipments all wait for further inspections. 
 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce noticed 
that there is no contingency plan for any disasters, like a pandemic, natural disaster or 
terrorist related disaster. It should be clarified what kind of products and people would 
be allowed to pass the border in case of a complete closure during the incident, but 
                                               
423 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 11 
424 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 19) 
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also following the event.425 
 
 
The following recommendation is to assure more efficient trusted shipper programs. 
The customs agencies should develop a system to share the work of inspections, 
outcomes, results and other information between neighbouring countries rather than 
having similar inspections on both sides of the border. 
 
Governments should start infrastructure improvements at the ports of entry. In 
particular, the designated FAST lanes have to start a couple of kilometers before the 
actual border to assure smooth flow of FAST certified drivers. As soon as the smooth 
process and the advantages of this program are known to the industry more companies 
will pursue a membership in those trade facilitating programs.426 The initial costs could 
be partly covered by the FAST program’ application fees. Although it would mean high 
up-front capital costs, the long-term profits generated through faster border processing 
would certainly outweigh them.  
 
Border agencies should start hiring part-time and seasonal workers to overcome peak 
times and thus reducing long waiting times. Although border agents have to undergo 
strict training, there are jobs involved in the process that do not require high skills or 
training. Jobs like paper handling or filing can be done by such workers.427 In particular, 
major ports of entry would benefit greatly from round the clock services with all 
government departments. 
 
 
For the individual supply chain agents it is important to only concentrate on certifying in 
programs that are absolutely necessary to keep the business up. Certifications in other 
initiatives are too expensive and do not bring any positive results back. Exel shows 
how it is enough to be C-TPAT qualified as a logistics provider rather than spend the 
money on a C-TPAT certification.428 
 
A good best practice for small and medium sized businesses is the use of a security 
consultant before and during the application process of a major security initiative like C-
TPAT. Cargo-partner’s application process was simplified enormously through a 
consultant’s help and support.429 
 
When shipments to one specific country are rare, it is advised to have an agent 
specialised in this country’s processes and policies. Both Exel and cargo-partner use 
                                               
425 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 27) 
426 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 12 
427 Cf. U.S. and Canadian Chambers of Commerce (2009), p. 21) 
428 Cf. interview with Paul Betscha and interview with Craig Hisle 
429 Cf. interview with Ralf Pfeufer 
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an agent for their operations in Mexico.430 
 
Another best practice for small companies is the use of an external IT service provider 
for the filing process. As cargo-partner, for example, is just handling a small number of 
filings, it is more cost effective to outsource then to have its own IT filing system.431  
 
The same applies to the customs clearance. If a company handles only a few actual 
customs clearances, it is more cost and time affective to use an external customs 
broker, just like Exel, cargo-partner and YRC Reimer do.432 A large company like DHL 
Global Forwarding is advised to incorporate a customs broker within the company’s 
structure.433 
 
To minimize research costs and related work, it is suggested to have solely one 
department collecting information and keeping up-to-date with new developments and 
intensifications of security regulations. YRC Reimer’s facilities, for instance, all receive 
updates from one central unit in its headquarters making it possible for the individual 
facilities to focus on the actual implementation of the security standards.434   
                                               
430 Cf. interview with Paul Betscha and interview with Ralf Pfeufer 
431 Cf. interview with Ralf Pfeufer 
432 Cf. interview with Paul Betscha, interview with Ralf Pfeufer and interview with Debbie Bychyk 
433 Cf. interview with Luis Coppel 
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5 Conclusion, outlook and summary  
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion about the findings of this thesis and a potential outlook 
for the future of security regulations in North America. In the end, a summary will be 
given. 
5.1 Conclusion 
The trend of security initiatives seems to calm down slowly and the focus is now more 
on a proper incorporation of the existing programs within the companies’ processes.  
While the existing programs cover all modes of transportation and different types of 
businesses, there are some companies that are more affected by this development 
than others. The biggest changes happened in the area of road and sea transportation. 
As far as businesses are concerned, logistics providers and carriers were affected the 
most. This thesis shows that whether a company pursues a certification or not is highly 
dependent on the type of business. It was discovered that compliance is much more 
important for carriers than for logistics providers. Also manufacturers need to be 
compliant if they want to continue exporting. 
 
The intensified security programs had an influence on the existing trade relationship 
and cooperation between the three NAFTA countries United States, Canada and 
Mexico. Although the NAFTA agreement was intended to bring the three North 
American countries closer together, the development of those stringent security 
programs seems to result in the opposite. Operations as well as strategies within 
industries in North America changed. Alterations on the operational side include 
diversion of truck routes or ship routes. Certain small businesses changed their 
strategies and stopped exporting as they were financially not capable of incorporating 
the intensified security standards in their processes. Governments are marketing trade 
facilitation as the primary incentive for participation in security programs. Yet, in reality 
those initiatives are curtailing trade. 
 
Companies who are involved in cross-border trade are facing numerous difficulties and 
challenges. The industry reports an overall increase of costs, both in initial investment 
costs as well as recurring costs. In particular, small businesses have troubles in raising 
the capital to undergo the application process and then maintain the security standards 
in the long run. The governments, however, say that the initiatives are not necessarily a 
financial burden. Most of the companies already had security standards in place. And 
those security improvements should rather be seen as an investment, the customs 
authorities argue. In the long-term they will lead to better and more efficient operations 
and this in turn can lead to higher revenue and cost reductions as well as growth. 
There is also frustration in the industry as to what extent the promised benefits of a 
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membership in one of those programs are realised. Many companies still experience 
long wait times at the border even after a successful certification. Furthermore, there 
are some areas that are not thoroughly thought through yet, like the regulations 
concerning LTL shipments shipped by a FAST certified carrier. This poses the question 
of whether or not the money and time needed for a certification are worth it when there 
are few discernable advantages for companies. The government, on the other side, 
sees the developments very positively. The security initiatives reduce bottlenecks at 
ports of entry and thus reduce the workload for the customs agents. This in turn allows 
them to focus on higher risk cargo from non C-TPAT members. This is in everybody’s 
interest. 
As far as benefits for companies go, tangible and intangible benefits can be found. 
Some companies do experience tangible benefits in the form of expedited border 
crossing since their membership in the C-TPAT and FAST program. Marketing 
opportunities present intangible benefits for a lot of companies and certifications in 
those security initiatives can give a company advantage over its competitors that are 
not certified. 
 
While a lot of companies support the idea of trusted shipper programs and security 
screening of air cargo, the purpose of supply chain wide programs are questioned by 
the industry. The general security and safety awareness rose in the past few years 
increasing the security standards over all industries and all processes. This 
development made a C-TPAT certification of every single company redundant. It could 
be proved that it is enough to be C-TPAT qualified while dealing with C-TPAT certified 
business partners. This way a secure supply chain can be guaranteed while saving the 
money that an application would cost the companies. 
Besides attempts to minimize existing overlaps, a lot of work is also required to make it 
easier for companies to achieve compliance. This can be assured through 
harmonization and standardization of security initiatives. In particular standardized 
forms, processes, IT systems and documents are essential to ensure efficiency. 
Harmonization attempts were successful for some initiatives, but the final goal should 
be harmonized programs and a single IT system for all of North America. 
Communication has to be improved between the different countries’ governments, 
between the industry and government institutions, but also within a country’s different 
institutions.  
In particular in times of financial crisis, North America should work together to enhance 
its competitiveness and strengthen the countries’ overall wealth. More and more 
markets are opening up in today’s world of globalization and collaboration can surely 
sustain North America’s competitive advantage.  
 
The implemented cargo security initiatives in North America are steps in the right 
direction. Today’s world requires higher security standards and increased precautions 
along supply chains. The governments’ developed programs are based on good ideas, 
their implementation, however, still needs some refinement. 
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5.2 Outlook 
It is obvious that global security can only be achieved in a collaborative effort of all 
countries including various supply chain security programs. The North American 
governments goals are to eventually save costs and operate more efficiently as a result 
of all the implemented initiatives. This can only happen if everybody along the supply 
chain fulfills their part. Security consciousness has risen in the years of the initiatives’ 
implementation and the three NAFTA countries will continue to strive to improve. The 
important thing now is to decrease complexity by harmonizing and standardizing 
programs and systems. Initial steps have been taken in that direction, but many more 
have to follow. 
 
Many companies have already implemented security initiatives in their organizational 
processes and increased their security standards. Now the time has come for them to 
benefit from their hard work in the past few years. They should start to see increasing 
number of customers, expedited border crossing, simplified data transfers with customs 
agencies and decreasing overall costs. Yet, it is realistic that those advantages will take 
another couple of years until companies will fully be able to experience them.  
Once fast and simple ways for a successful implementation are spread within the 
industry and the overall costs for a certification decrease, the amount of small 
businesses in cross-border trade will hopefully increase. 
For those companies who are not certified yet, success of their business and the 
number of clients in the next few years will define their strategy. They are either forced 
to get certified as customers start preferring competitors that are certified over them. Or 
their strategy will be proved correct and show that meeting the standards without 
having an actual certificate of membership in one of those programs is enough to stay 
competitive. 
 
This area of research will certainly stay interesting and exciting in the future and 
regulations and minimum standards will keep changing on a regular basis. Hopefully 
North America will come to a consensus and will work together to bring the NAFTA idea 
back to life. 
5.3 Summary 
Since the terror attacks of New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, 
cargo security initiatives and programs have increased enormously. Starting with the 
United States, also Canada and Mexico soon developed their own regulations. Most 
initiatives can be found for road and maritime shipments, but also air transportation is 
facing increasing security standards. The most important U.S. initiatives are the Free 
and Secure Trade (FAST) program and Electronic Truck Manifest on the road side and 
  85 
the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the 24-Hour-Advance-Vessel-Manifest-Rule (24-
Hour-Rule), the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements (ISF) and 
the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) on the maritime side. Air transportation has the Air 
Automated Manifest System (Air AMS) as well as physical screening of cargo and on 
the rail side there is the Rail Automated Manifest System (Rail AMS). The Customs 
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) covers all modes of transportation and 
even expands beyond the U.S. borders into the whole world.  
Canada has the eManifest for road carriers, the Customs Self Assessment Program 
(CSA), the Commercial Driver Registration Program and the FAST program for road 
shipments. The Marine Transportation Security Clearance Program, Advance 
Commercial Information (ACI) Marine program and CSI cover maritime transportation. 
The Advance Commercial Information Air program, also called ACI Air program, deals 
with shipments via airplane and the Memorandum of Understanding on rail security and 
eManifest for rail carriers with shipments via train. Similar to the U.S. C-TPAT, Canada 
has developed its Partnership in Protection (PIP) program. 
Mexico has the Cross Border Truck Safety Inspection Program and FAST on the road 
side, the 24 hours Advance Cargo Manifest Rule on the sea side and the Mexico 
Advanced Cargo Requirements for air carriers on the air side. 
The Business Alliance for Secure Commerce (BASC) is a supply chain security 
program in Latin America and the Caribbean that was developed completely by private 
corporations in order to improve overall security. The Transported Asset Protection 
Association (TAPA) follows a similar idea, but includes only shipments of highly 
valuable goods like high technology products. 
To summarize those programs three levels can be looked at in more detail. The U.S. 
24-Hour-Rule, ISF, Air AMS and Rail AMS, the Canadian eManifest, ACI Marine 
program, ACI Air program and eManifest for rail carriers as well as the Mexican 24 
hours Advance Cargo Manifest Rule and Advanced Cargo Requirements for air carriers 
all cover the area of information processes. The actual physical controls are done by X-
ray, screening and physical inspections through programs like CSI and cargo screening 
for air cargo. C-TPAT and PIP as well as BASC cover the whole supply chain and are 
based on background checks of every single agent involved in the supply chain. 
 
There have been numerous attempts to collaborate on the security and safety issue 
around the world and also within the continent of North America. The WCO’s SAFE 
Framework and ISPS code are examples of cooperation between countries around the 
world. The NAFTA agreement’s idea was intensive collaboration between the three 
countries United States, Canada and Mexico. While tax exemptions for goods traded 
between the NAFTA countries are a standard practice, harmonized security systems 
and regulations still need to be improved in the future. Frequent traveller programs 
proved that harmonization across the North American countries is possible and thanks 
to those programs travel time was increased and wait times reduced. There are also 
attempts to develop one single IT system for North America for storing data, 
communicating between the different parties involved and filing before crossing the 
border. Once this standardization has successfully been completed, additional overlaps 
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will need to be identified and worked on. 
Problems that hamper those improvements from being made are missing 
communication, separate developments of programs and related systems as well as 
cultural differences. Collaboration requires a lot of time and effort and both are scarce 
resources in times of fast moving markets and financial crisis. Cooperation is not only 
necessary between the different countries, but also between the governments’ different 
institutions as well as the governments and the industry. As far as Mexico is concerned, 
extra work is required to bring Mexico up to the same level as its northern neighbours 
concerning the economic and social development.  
 
Trade in North America was heavily influenced by the intensification of security 
standards. There are long border wait times due to insufficient border infrastructure, 
lacking effective technology, redundant procedures and inspections and staffing 
constraints. The countries try to work on improving the situation at major ports of entry, 
but often not all factors are being considered. As a consequence of these long wait 
times, companies are forced to change their operations which in most cases leads to 
more costs for these companies. Also increasing costs hamper trade as small and 
medium businesses are financially not strong enough to take high border-crossing 
fees, penalty fees or the initial costs of an application for one of those programs. 
Initially companies were promised benefits after a certification in security programs has 
been achieved, but reality shows that those advantages are not there yet. Thus, rather 
than facilitating trade, those security programs hinder trade and lead to a decrease in 
NAFTA trade in the past years. 
 
During the research several logistics providers and carriers were interviewed and the 
initiatives’ impact on those businesses was analyzed. All interviewed businesses 
operate across the North American continent and thus all companies should be equally 
compliant. The study, however, shows that certification in security programs are more 
important to certain types of businesses. Carriers seem to be obliged to achieve 
compliance in order to not lose any customers. As logistics providers are only dealing 
with the organization and paperwork of a shipment, their compliance is not absolutely 
required. Carriers are the ones who physically ship the goods across the border and 
need to be certified to avoid wait times and inspections. 
What is true for everybody involved is an increase in work. All interviewed companies 
as well as recent studies show that companies either had to increase their number of 
employees or their employees had to work harder in the years of the initiatives’ 
implementation. It is not only time and work intensive to apply for membership in one of 
those security initiatives, also keeping up-to-date with new developments and 
regulations results in more work. Moreover, also certain processes had to be changed 
to be able to follow the governments’ requirements.  
 
Compliance with security programs has advantages as well as disadvantages for 
businesses. There are costs related to certifications in those security programs. Those 
costs can either be initial investment costs or recurring costs. Initial costs include 
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infrastructure improvement costs, restructuring costs and research costs. Recurring 
costs could be due to additional staffing, security filing transactions, inspections or 
continuous maintenance of facilities. Benefits include expedited border crossing once 
participation in a trusted traveller program is achieved, marketing opportunities for 
those companies who are compliant and in turn more business and increasing 
numbers of customers. Yet, only a few companies actually experience those promised 
benefits and it is still questionable if compliance with the programs is worth the involved 
money and time. 
  
Most companies see the security initiatives themselves as a trade facilitation, but their 
implementation often presents a hindrance. Acquiring new processes, incorporating the 
required IT systems and learning how to use them needs time and patience and this is 
the part the majority of the companies struggle with. Once everything is set up, 
businesses are in favour of cargo expediting programs like the FAST initiative. C-TPAT 
is heavily criticized as compliance with some other programs basically covers C-TPAT’s 
area and companies do not see a reason for redundant controls.   
 
There is still a lot of work that needs to be done in the future to make those security 
initiatives a trade facilitation. Recommendations to achieve this goal include more 
communication between the countries, between the governments and the industry and 
between the different government institutions, increased harmonization and 
standardization as far as inspections, processes and the IT system go as well as 
infrastructure improvements at major port of entry. Furthermore, lower participation 
costs for small businesses, special regulations for LTL shipments and more employees 
at border facilities during peak times are recommendable. Also a contingency plan for 
any disasters should be developed. 
For the individual agents it is suggested to only apply for programs that are absolutely 
necessary to keep the business going. A consultant during the application process is 
cost effective as well as outsourcing the filing process. Also agents for areas where 
business is rare and a central department collecting information on new developments 
and regulations should be considered to minimize costs.  
 
Summarizing it should be clarified that the whole supply chain must be secured in order 
to achieve a safe international trade environment. It is not enough to implement 
measures in just a small area or only one mode of transportation. 
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Appendix 4 CSI certified ports438 
 
In North and South America: 
Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver, Canada 
Santos, Brazil 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Port of Cortes, Honduras 
Caucedo, Dominican Republic 
Kingston, Jamaica 
Freeport, Bahamas 
Balboa and Colón and Manzanillo, Panama 
Cartagena, Colombia 
 
In Europe: 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Le Havre and Marseille, France 
Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany 
Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium 
Gothenburg, Sweden 
Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury and Southampton, United Kingdom 
Genoa, La Spezia, Livorno, Naples and Gioia Tauro, Italy 
Piraeus, Greece 
Algeciras, Barcelona and Valencia, Spain 
Lisbon, Portugal 
 
In Asia: 
Singapore 
Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe, Japan 
Hong Kong 
Pusan, Korea 
Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia 
Laem Chabang, Thailand 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, China 
Kaohsiung and Chi-Lung, Taiwan 
Colombo, Sri Lanka 
Port Salalah, Oman 
Quasim, Pakistan 
Ashdod and Haifa, Israel 
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In Africa: 
Durban, South Africa 
Port Alexandria, Egypt  
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Appendix 6 Partners in Protection Certificate440 
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